


JPRS-TAC-89-008
28 FEBRUARY 1989



FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-008

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China Welcomes Early European Disarmament Accord

OW2202210789 Beijing XINHUA in English
1320 GMT 21 Feb 89

[Text] Geneva, February 21 (XINHUA)—China welcomes the "encouraging developments" in the East-West disarmament talks and expects all parties concerned to reach an early agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe, a Chinese diplomat said Tuesday [21 February].

Fan Guoxiang, Chinese U.N. ambassador for disarmament affairs, told a regular session of the 40-nation U.N.

conference on disarmament that an agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe would strengthen security and stability in Europe and the world as a whole.

"In an area where there is a high concentration of conventional and nuclear arms, a conventional war is likely to escalate into a nuclear one," he said.

Fan said the superpowers, as the owners of the largest military arsenals, should take special responsibility for conventional disarmament.

He called on the countries of the world not to use their military forces except for self defense. He also called for all military forces to withdraw from foreign territories.

JAPAN

**Controls on Export of Potential Chemical Arms
Materials Tightened**

*OW0302062289 Tokyo KYODO in English
0518 GMT 3 Feb 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb 3 KYODO—The cabinet on Friday approved a proposed change in a government ordinance in order to limit exports of a chemical that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons, officials said.

The proposed new ordinance calls for subjecting the export of thionyl chloride to official permission to be issued on a case-by-case basis, from February 16, the officials said.

This brings to 10 the number of chemicals subject to official export control under Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, they said.

The decision is in line with an international agreement struck last December by 19 nations, including Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, to crack down on the export of chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of chemical arms.

The move came 3 weeks after the world community pledged to outlaw all chemical weapons and to sign a convention enforcing the ban at a Paris meeting attended by 149 nations.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Commentary Hits NATO Reaction to Warsaw Pact Arms Data

AU0302204889 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
2 Feb 89 p 7

[Bedrich Zagar commentary in the "Word on Events" column: "NATO Has Similar Possibilities"]

[Text] The Western information media are currently focusing attention on the publication of data on the strength of the Warsaw Pact member states' armed forces and arms in relation to NATO's armed forces, as well as on the unilateral reduction of troops and arms, and of defense spending by individual socialist countries. Naturally, the reactions are full of contradictions. After welcoming the publication of the data, as is only proper, the media point out their allegedly "unclear and imprecise" nature.

Proceeding from these remarks, one should perhaps stress once again that data on the Warsaw Pact's armed forces are absolutely precise and are the outcome of numerous consultations between the Pact states' defense ministries—in other words, their reliability is guaranteed by the governments of the socialist states. This, however, cannot be said of data coming from the NATO bloc. Even if such information does appear in the press from various sources, it is usually contradictory and not confirmed by anyone. That is why, in reviews on the correlation of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces and arms, the data on the Western military alliance are based on information supplied by the intelligence services of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states.

The differences between the data contained in releases issued by the Warsaw Pact's Defense Ministers Committee and in NATO releases are also due to the fact that the two sides have a different approach to the criteria for assessing individual types of arms. Let us take the number of tanks in the two military groupings as an example. Whereas the data supplied by the Warsaw Pact include all tanks without exception, NATO mentions a rather indefinite category of "main battle tanks." Moreover, NATO speaks of a mere 16,000 tanks deployed in its units—it does not mention further thousands of tanks mothballed in depots. The NATO tanks are said to be offensive weapons, and antitank missiles—in which NATO has supremacy—are termed defensive weapons, regardless of the fact that tanks and antitank missiles can be used both for attack and for defense, depending on one's intent.

However, disputes about the nature and utilization of weapons are not the main thing—such matters should be left to experts at the upcoming Warsaw Pact-NATO negotiations on reducing conventional armed forces and arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. The surprising thing is the way that the Warsaw Pact's disarmament initiatives have been received in the capitals of the Western states. Why are

we hearing that Washington is concerned lest its West European allies should follow the example of the Warsaw Pact states? Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to the U.S. President, warns that "Moscow's disarmament fireworks" should be curbed, because they are causing immense damage to NATO and "stimulating unrest in the Western alliance." It seems that Brent Scowcroft is taking upon himself the task of being the main curber of the disarmament process and, in fact, of Soviet-U.S. relations, which have been developing so well. He has dreamed up a whole number of arguments for slowing the positive development of international relations, basing his claims on the deduction that disarmament suits Moscow's interests, and that the cold war has allegedly not yet ended.

Scowcroft reproaches the Soviet Union outright for wanting to use the disarmament initiative for purposes of stabilization and to remove economic problems. Could it be that the United States has no economic problems of its own? Were Scowcroft to read with proper attention the interview that President George Bush gave to TIME magazine, he would find that he in fact contradicts his own president. In the United States it is generally said that Bush must now suffer the consequences of the "successes of Reaganomics." George Bush also said in the interview that he had already acquainted himself with the U.S. deficit figures and that he found them "atrocious." How will he get rid of these "atrocious" figures, if he has promised the American people that he will not raise taxes on any account? The only acceptable possibility would be to cut down the enormous military spending.

After all, if Brent Scowcroft believes that the disarmament initiatives of the socialist countries are harming and alarming the NATO countries, and if he concedes that the United States does have economic difficulties, then why is nobody in Washington calling for a disarmament offensive, so as to "alarm" the Warsaw Pact states with peace proposals and unilateral disarmament measures? Surely NATO, too, has this possibility.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Foreign Minister Fischer Briefs Deputies on CSCE Talks

LD1002161789 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1318 GMT 10 Feb 89

[Excerpts] Berlin—Under the leadership of its chairman, Hermann Axen, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the People's Chamber met on Friday. GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer informed the deputies on the results of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna. This meeting, the minister underlined, had assigned a firm place in the CSCE process to disarmament questions with negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and on confidence and security-building measures. It is, therefore, above all a matter of genuine reductions guaranteeing a stable and secure balance of armed forces and arms from the Atlantic to the Urals at a lower level.

The significant, unilateral, prior concessions of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and other socialist states are securing a good start for the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately, one cannot say this of the recently known activities of the Western side, Oskar Fischer noted. He thereby pointed to the discovery of the FRG plans to build its own attack missiles, the forced temporary halting of which cannot, in truth, be described as a prior concession. The minister underlined that reductions such as those undertaken by the GDR, for example, would be genuine prior concessions from the FRG.

The GDR affirmed its readiness to negotiate on the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and positions itself resolutely against the modernization of nuclear and conventional weapons as practiced by NATO.

Much of what was written down in the concluding document of the Vienna meeting is already in practice in the GDR, the deputies noted. At the same time the GDR will work cooperatively, conscious of its responsibility, at the further deepening of cooperation between the participant states. It will take up what has been agreed in the framework of its national legislature.

Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer praised the efforts of numerous states and of the UN secretary general to find political and thereby peaceful settlements to international and regional conflicts. [passage omitted]

At the conclusion of the discussion Hermann Axen noted that the change in international relations is reflected in the variety and complexity of the questions dealt with. The peace program of the socialist states and the far-reaching initiatives of the GDR are an important contribution to the consolidation and further progress of this trend.

Commentary Criticizes FRG KOLAS Missile Project

AU1402172389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10 Feb 89 p 2

[W.M. commentary: "Dangerous Yes-And-No Answer From Bonn"]

[Text] One can melt the following official message by Bonn's government spokesman in one's mouth: Together with the responsible minister, the chancellor decided to temporarily suspend the KOLAS missile project, but to finally abandon it only if a balance on a lower level is agreed upon in the Vienna talks. Thus, the question whether the FRG will get itself a first-strike system with a range of about 500 km that can be fitted with both conventional and nuclear warheads, has officially been answered with yes and no.

The decision, which was made rapidly by Bonn standards, first of all shows that some people feel that they have been caught redhanded, which is also reflected in almost the entire FRG press. It shows that the outcry, which this provocation of the Vienna talks has caused in

the FRG and also in other countries, was certainly heard. It looks as if some people in Bonn are beginning to realize now that, apart from its military function, the KOLAS project is also suited to increase the currently two-thirds of missile opponents in the FRG to three-quarters or even nine-tenths. Maybe people will ultimately become more sensitive in this respect and realize that those, who push such a project that increases the arms buildup, will be regarded as the severest disarmament opponents in the eyes of all those, who really want to achieve peace. KOLAS has certainly proved to be no trump card for Kohl.

However, Bonn's yes-and-no answer has yet another, very dangerous, aspect: The project, for which a total of DM100 million have already been wasted, is not abandoned. On the contrary, the official declaration notes that its fundamental technological feasibility has been proved and that an option on this project will be maintained up to a certain stage in the Vienna talks. Put bluntly: The FRG missiles, which can be used in two ways, are to be introduced as an element of blackmail in the talks on conventional forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. While we have already made advance concessions for successful talks in Vienna in the form of unilateral disarmament steps, the FRG threatens with a new arm: buildup project. In practical terms this means: to cause discord with more weapons.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE pointed out a further connection: The KOLAS missiles are the follow-up system of the Pershing 1A, on which Bonn agreed in October 1987. However, in August 1987, the chancellor announced, as the FRG's contribution to the INF Treaty, that the Pershing 1A missiles would not be modernized but dismantled.

What exactly is Europe and what is the world to think about the words and deeds of the government of Western Europe's strongest military power?

Defense Minister Kessler Addresses Management Cadres on Disarmament

AU1302140189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 11-12 Feb 89 p 2

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Army General Heinz Kessler, SED Central Committee Politburo member and minister of National Defense, spoke about current military policy issues at the Socialist Economic Management Central Institute of the SED Central Committee on Friday [10 February]. Before leading SED cadres from state and the industry, he paid tribute to the unilateral disarmament steps taken by the Warsaw Pact countries and the comparison of forces submitted by them as important contributions toward peace and disarmament in Europe. He said that this also applies to the decision announced by Erich Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR State Council chairman, to reduce the National People's Army and the GDR's defense expenditures. He said that in keeping with the special responsibility on the

sensitive border between imperialism and socialism, this unilateral step proves the sincerity and predictability of socialist foreign, security, and military policies.

Heinz Kessler stressed that the nations rightly expect NATO politicians and military officials to make substantial contributions to reducing their offensive potential while respecting the real balance of forces. The appeal to forego any attempts to get around the intermediate-range missile agreement and to plan similar disarmament measures for its armed forces is particularly addressed to the FRG Government, he said. The Defense Minister stressed that the members of the National People's Army are currently making major efforts to further emphasize the armed forces' defensive nature. They are preparing for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR and the 12th SED Congress with high performance in political and combat training, he said. He stressed that for the people's soldiers, military service is peace service.

In talks in the central institute, Army General Heinz Kessler informed himself about problems related to research and theory regarding the enforcement of the SED's economic strategy. Director Professor Helmut Koziolek, SED Central Committee member, reported that the institute's work is aimed in particular at the tasks that result from the complex management of technical, economic, and social processes in combines and enterprises in the broad application of key technologies.

GDR-FRG Symposium Discusses Disarmament
AU1302120389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 11-12 Feb 89 p 5

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The two German states' historic responsibility for furthering disarmament and detente in Europe was discussed at a 3-day symposium in the Gustav Heinemann Academy in Freudenberg, FRG, in which scientists from the GDR and the FRG took part. In the concluding panel discussion on Friday [10 February], historians from both countries advocated the development of reliable and stable relations between the GDR and the FRG. The meeting, which was organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, dealt with some aspects of *Realpolitik* from the Bismarck Reich until today.

Data on U.S. Chemical Weapons in FRG Said Needed To Verify Ban
AU1402170089 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 13 Feb 89 p 2

["W.M." commentary: "Geneva Disarmament Conference, Chemical Weapons, and Bonn"]

[Text] The UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva has the global banning of chemical weapons on its agenda. This body, consisting of 40 states, has received new

impetus from the chemical weapons conference in Paris, in which 149 states participated. The peoples also want these insidious agents of mass destruction to be eliminated from the earth. For although the convention has already been largely developed and the 40 states in Geneva have reached a consensus on it, there is no telling when it will be concluded. The Geneva observer from the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU calls the United States an inhibitor. Its chemical industry has intimated that foreign inspectors are not wanted on its facilities. There are frequent objections as regards industrial espionage, it is stated.

However, it is clear that a ban on chemical weapons does not work without verification. It is clear that transparency in the production, storage, and deployment of chemical as well as nuclear and conventional weapons is unavoidable. The "Responsibility for Peace" initiative of natural scientists states with concern: "Except for the fact that they exist, there is hardly any official data on U.S. chemical weapons arsenals in the FRG. All the successive federal governments have always refused to provide more detailed information." The British expert Robinson estimates the United States' chemical ammunition in the FRG at approximately 6,000 tonnes. This is a great danger, not only for FRG citizens, but also for the whole of densely populated central Europe.

Thus, the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone which, as the GDR and the CSSR proposed to the FRG, should for the time being be established on the territories of the three countries, is very topical. From the point of view of the states and peoples and their security interests, there is not a single argument against such a zone as a step toward a chemical-weapon-free world. An additional argument for it is the opportunity to gather practical experiences by verification; for the project, which has been developed together with the SPD, of course contains exact definitions to this effect.

In view of the situation in Geneva, the appearance of the FRG representative, which is planned for this week, will be especially interesting. All the more so as, at the same time, FRG citizens are standing trial in Pirmasens because they demonstrated against the storage of U.S. chemical weapons in their country. It is now hardly possible to take into account the people's vital interest solely by further generally professing a worldwide ban. A clear, concrete position is required from the FRG toward those who have crammed the FRG with chemical weapons but are stalling in Geneva, and toward those who hold out their hands to Bonn to create a chemical weapon-free zone in central Europe.

INDIA

Reaction to Gorbachev 7 Dec UN Speech on Troop Cuts

Message From Gandhi

52500022 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 9 Dec 88 p 1

[Excerpt] Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on Thursday congratulated President Gorbachev for taking "very far reaching initiatives which would contribute to a better international climate.

In a telegraphic message to Mr Gorbachev on his UN General Assembly announcement of a unilateral curtailment and withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Eastern Europe and proposals for a ceasefire in Afghanistan and a 100-year moratorium in the Third World debt, Mr Gandhi said that his proposals were fully in keeping with the spirit of the Delhi Declaration signed by him and Mr. Gorbachev in November 1986.

Welcoming the Soviet announcement of curtailment in conventional forces and armament in Europe, India hoped that it would evoke a favourable response from all other countries, an official spokesman said.

He said that the far reaching Gorbachev proposals aimed at reducing international tensions and creating a climate of confidence for tackling some of the most important global issues.

With the hope that practical and needful steps would be taken to realise this goal, India shared with the Soviet Union the vision of a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world as expressed in the Delhi Declaration, the spokesman said.

India, he said, also agreed with the Soviet Union that the continued bloodshed in Afghanistan be put to an end at the earliest and stood for strict and sincere implementation of Geneva Accord by the concerned countries.

He said that for a lasting solution to the Afghan problem it was vital that Afghanistan's sovereignty and non-aligned character be preserved and various measures towards this end could be considered. [Passage omitted]

Two Communist Parties Praise Speech

52500022 Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
10 Dec 88 p 9

[Excerpt] New Delhi, Dec 9—The CPI(M) [Communist Party of India (Marxist)] has welcomed the proposal of the Soviet President, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, to unilaterally reduce Soviet armed troops and conventional armaments. "These proposals are of immense significance in the struggle for world peace and disarmament and reaffirm the sincerity of the Soviet Union in achieving a world free from nuclear weapons," a party spokesman stated here yesterday.

The spokesman added that the party considered the new Afghan initiatives of Mr Gorbachev as highly significant. "Coming in the background of the continuous violation of the Geneva accord by the USA, these proposals linked to a cease-fire with the induction of the United Nations peace-keeping force will go a long way in achieving peace and bringing stability to the region."

The CPI(M) also considered as "extremely important" the proposal of a 100-year moratorium on Third World debt. This echoes the feelings of the millions in the Third World who are groaning under economic misery and voices the concern raised in the forums of the non-aligned movement and the UN earlier. The problem of the increasing gap between development and developed countries requires to be removed and the call for a summit of creditor and debtor nations to resolve the debt problem must be accepted." The CPI [Communist Party of India] too has welcomed Mr. Gorbachev's peace proposals.

In a statement issued here today, the central secretariat of the CPI said that Mr. Gorbachev's offers of unilateral troop reduction, 100-year moratorium on Third World debts and cease-fire in Afghanistan were "unprecedented and of tremendous significance for the struggle of entire humanity for peace, disarmament and development".

The CPI "deplored the negative attitudes of the Governments of USA and Pakistan, as well as some sections of the Mujahedeen, towards these very positive proposals. We hope that even now they will reconsider their position and agree to the constructive and reasonable proposals". The party also welcomed the "positive stand taken by the Government of India towards these proposals", and called upon "all peace loving, democratic and progressive forces in India to lend their support" to them. [Passage omitted]

'Moscow Serious About Reducing Tensions'

52500022 Madras THE HINDU in English
9 Dec 88 p 8

[Editorial: "Mr Gorbachev's New Initiative"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] There is bound to be enthusiasm the world over at Mr Gorbachev's pronouncements in New York, with Washington coming under varying degrees of pressure from its allies in Europe and Asia to respond constructively to the latest development. It will be quite difficult for anyone to dismiss the unilateral cut in military forces as just a propaganda ploy intended to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. From the standpoint of the hardliners, one of their major fears has been removed—that the so-called de-nuclearization of Europe with an "overwhelming" Soviet superiority on the conventional front was not in the interest of the Western world. Now the offer to cut some 500,000 troops along with the support systems would go a long way in assuring nations in those regions that Moscow is serious about reducing global and

regional tensions. Although U.S. officials have responded favourably to the idea of the exit of some half a million Soviet troops, some have voiced the concern that even after the announced reductions, Moscow would still be in an advantageous position. Hawks in the Bush administration would be pushing the new President to deal with the Soviet Union from a "position of strength," but he would have to realise that harping on the intentions of Moscow or a general reluctance to match Moscow's offers would not only dilute the gains made so far but also postpone the further reduction of global tensions. The differences on regional issues aside—for instance, on Afghanistan the Soviet Union has said that a ceasefire ought to be linked with the stoppage of arms supplies to the belligerents—prime attention on the Bush administration will be on the arms control negotiations where efforts to reach an understanding on a 50 per cent cut in the strategic arsenals are stalemated as a result of Washington's insistence to proceed with the Strategic Defence Initiative. The Bush administration would be under pressure to match Mr. Gorbachev's imaginative initiatives.

PAKISTAN

Commentary on Test Firing of Long-Range Missiles

BK1302043789 Islamabad Domestic Service
in English 1600 GMT 12 Feb 89

[Mohammad Yamin commentary]

[Text] With the successful launching of indigenously developed surface-to-surface long range missile, Pakistan has achieved a distinct landmark in this advanced field of defense technology. The trial firing of the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles was conducted with a high degree of accuracy and achieved the predicted range of 80 to 300 km respectively.

The trial has proved the system and with more experience and expertise it should be possible to effect further improvements in it. Besides the surface-to-surface missiles, Pakistan-made multi-barrel rocket launchers were also test fired. A range of 25 km was achieved by these rocket launchers. With refinement the range would expand to 30 km.

The chief of the Army Staff [Mirza Aslam Beg], who witnessed the trial firing of missiles and rocket launchers, described the achievement as a befitting tribute and compliment to the nation, which upholds such ideals of democracy under which national institutions like the Armed Forces grow and attain excellence and height of glory.

The indigenous development and production of long range surface-to-surface missiles would add a great deal to the defense capability of the country's Armed Forces, particularly in view of the fact that other parts in the region had already acquired much more sophisticated military equipment and weapons systems.

While Pakistan does not have aggressive designs against any other country, it has the right as a sovereign nation to safeguard its own territorial integrity by all legitimate means. The successful test firing of Hatf missiles underscores Pakistan's resolve to keep abreast with modern developments and not to be left behind in the field of advanced technology. It should also serve (as a reminder) to those who do not wish Pakistan well that despite its peaceful intentions and respect for the independence of other states, Pakistan will not lower its own guard lest its commitment to nonuse of force and settlement of outstanding issues through negotiations is mistaken for complacency and weakness.

As pointed out by General Mirza Aslam Beg, the coincidence of the successful test firing of missiles by Pakistan with the liberation of the Afghan people adds a new dimension to the distinction achieved by the Pakistani technologists. It underlines boldly the fact that only those people can safeguard their freedom and national pride who are willing to put in hard work for it and who are prepared to make sacrifices for it.

Also the fact should not be lost sight of that with the virtual explosion of scientific knowledge around us no advance is enormous and no distinction too great. Pakistan can therefore ill-afford to rest content with the achievements made by it so far and constantly strive for even better goals, so that it is able to maintain a position of dignity and honor in the comity of nations.

Political, Military Factors Blocking 'Imperialism' From War

52000012 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL

in Russian No 19, Oct 88 pp 17-24

[Article by Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Serebryanikov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor. "Blocking Wars: A Political Mechanism"]

[Text] In the nuclear age the struggle for peace has also become a struggle for the survival of mankind. This struggle goes through a number of stages: achieving a reduction of military danger; creating a reliable international mechanism for blocking wars; eliminating nuclear weapons, and then the material base of war as a whole (disarmament); and the future disappearance of the very source of wars—imperialism. Specific goals and content, unique forms and methods of actions by peace loving forces; and regrouping their composition are inherent to each stage.

The defense of socialism primarily and fundamentally coincides with the task common to all mankind of preventing a new war. The military doctrine of the USSR and the other socialist countries in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, their defense structure, and the activity of their armed forces are subordinated to this task.

Socialism and other peace-loving forces are taking active steps to create a mechanism for blocking war. The action of this mechanism is to provide for a transition from a world based on a balance of force, to a world based on a balance of interests, cooperation and trust. Such a mechanism does not have the goal, and is not capable, of abolishing class contradiction and competition, but merely serves to prevent this historical dispute, as well as other contradictions in the world arena, from being decided by military means.

To block war means to exert influence most of all on the ruling circles of the imperialist states, in such a way as to compel them to restructure their foreign policy on the basis of the new political thinking, recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence, and rejection of the policy of force and military threat, and also to create stable political, legal, economic, spiritual, cultural, and humanitarian barriers in the path of unleashing war and force in world affairs. Today an integrated mechanism for blocking wars is being formed, the elements of which are interacting ever more closely. It seems to us that the following elements can be associated with it: the international political system that is taking shape, which includes the new political thinking as an expression of mankind's common interest in salvation from a new war, and the theoretical foundations of security in the nuclear age; political, legal and moral norms, and global and regional organizations, which are called upon especially to regulate the military and political relationships of states for the purpose of preventing wars and military conflicts

and building reliable universal security; the aggregate of political, economic and cultural ties among countries and peoples; and the activity of peace-loving social movements and organizations.

It is known that the aggressive nature of imperialism does not automatically and directly engender war. Wars are prepared consciously by governments, which express the interest of the most warlike part of the ruling classes of the imperialist states. The aggressive policy of imperialism acts as a direct factor in stimulating the preparation of war. It is it that is the mainspring in the NATO countries that makes for intensive action of the source of war.

The aggressive nature of an antagonistic society can be fettered primarily through influencing the policy of its ruling circles. Their accepting the new political thinking, and shifting it to the plane of practical actions, are the starting point that naturally conditions the formation of a policy of supporting peaceful coexistence, a policy toward detente in the political and military spheres, and toward limiting, reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, and leads to the acceptance of defensive doctrines, and dismantling of obsolete concepts of aggression.

Internal factors that induce restructuring of the international policy of imperialist states are the growing anti-military movements in these states; the struggle of the working class and the broad mass of workers; the exacerbation of social contradictions; and the worsening of the economic situation due to growing military expenditures. In the capitalist countries, such motives for strengthening the struggle of the broad masses to change foreign policy toward peaceful coexistence as recognition of the fatality of a new war for human civilization, and the folly of militarization of the economy, are having an ever more intense effect. In the opinion of a number of American scholars, "faced by the nuclear threat, a commonality of interests arose in both superpowers, uniting them against total war, the biggest victims of which would be themselves," which forces even passive strata of Americans to influence more actively the development of more realistic foreign policy and military decisions in their country.

At the present time, in the Western countries the transition to a new phase of technological revolution is being carried out to a significant extent on a militaristic foundation, which increases the danger of war, and thus touches all strata of the population and extends the framework of general protest, which is moving far beyond the bounds of economic demands. Mass pressure on the policy of the ruling circles is increasing, and the military-industrial complex has been called back.

The growth of mass protest against the exorbitant burden of the arms race, and the threat of perishing in a nuclear war, will inevitably push ruling circles in the West to choose in favor of a more realistic policy.

Needless to say, such a transition can hardly be anticipated to be easy, painless, or without relapses of aggressive outbursts. But, historical experience and science confirm that, with today's level of technology and organization of production, conversion and demilitarization of the economy are entirely possible.

Modern war presumes tremendous economic, sociopolitical, scientific and technical, ideological and purely military preparation, in which the entire population takes part in one way or another. If the peoples of the capitalist countries will decisively oppose the policy of war, its apologists will to a significant extent lose the capability to prepare and unleash aggression. Georgiy Dimitrov wrote years ago: "If... the masses, without whom war cannot be waged, decisively and in a timely manner oppose the military plans of states, they can force them to reject war and the connivances of the military conspirators." Opportunities in this respect are becoming ever more extensive, although they must not be overestimated. A most stubborn battle is facing the peace-loving forces, in order to cause the states to reject the policy of force, and recognize the social, political and cultural diversity of the modern world, and the right of each people to freely choose its social system.

The internal aspect of localizing the sources of wars, although it is markedly intensifying, still lags in its development behind the external factors blocking war: strengthening dialog and allaying tension; maintaining strategic military parity between the USSR and the United States, and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO; and strengthening the role of international organizations and movements, especially the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement, etc. It is precisely these factors that are forcing the leaders of the United States and NATO to display elements of good sense in their approach to relations with the USSR, and to the problem of war and peace, although so far there have been no fundamental changes in the position of the ruling circles in the West in this field. Movement in settling the Afghan problem, the cease fire agreement in the Iran-Iraq conflict, solving the problems in southern Africa, etc., became possible as a result of a general improvement in the international situation, and stepped up activity by the UN Security Council and General Secretary. It is entirely obvious that this became possible as a result of the spreading of the new political thinking in international relations.

The new impetus in the development of economic, political, legal, cultural and scientific ties between states with opposing social systems serves to block war, although, due to the resistance of militaristic circles in the West, these ties are extremely slow to be set up, meeting artificially created barriers every step of the way. But it is precisely the development of the totality of world relations that is called upon to create an unbreakable fabric of interaction.

A new economic order, which would take into account the interests of all countries and peoples on an equal basis, is called upon to become an important material element of an all-encompassing system of peace and international security, and an indispensable condition for blocking a new war.

A tremendous reserve for strengthening and all manner of expansion of world economic ties, and for affirming the foundations of peaceful coexistence and blocking war, is contained in the restructuring that is taking place in the USSR. Movement of the Soviet Union to a leading level in the most important economic indices will enable this huge and most rich country to be included in the worldwide division of labor as it never has been. Naturally, such an extension and strengthening of economic relationships will cause the development of world integration and interdependence, and will substantially narrow the material opportunities for military intervention of reactionary forces in world affairs, and for manifestation of the imperialist policy of force or the threat of force.

International political and legal norms directed at ensuring peace and security serve as one of the main means of normalizing military and political relationships of states, opposing a policy of force, and preventing war. There are a number of agreements in this sphere, which are called upon to block war, namely: the Paris Pact of 1928 on prohibiting resorting to war between states; the UN Charter proclaimed the banning of war by the broader principle of non-use of force and threat of force, which was truly revolutionary in international law; the agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war between the USSR and the United States (1971); the ABM Treaty (1972); the agreements on limiting strategic offensive arms—SALT-I (1972) and SALT-II (1979); and the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles. The Soviet-Indian declaration on the principles of a world free of nuclear weapons and force is of fundamental importance. These international legal documents superimpose certain limitations on the military policy and actions of states, narrow the expansionistic capabilities of aggressive forces, and form in world society a conscious attitude toward aggressive war as unlawful, illegal, and unjust.

In the opinion of Soviet scholars, the extent of development of international law on questions of ensuring peace, and substantiating the illegality of war and a policy of force, still lags behind the requirements of social progress. International law still contains few agreements on limiting the arms race and preventing the employment of military means to solve disputes among states. Much work lies ahead in this field in order for international law to include effective measures to block war. And so far no mechanism for strictly monitoring and ensuring the unwavering observance of agreements that have already been reached has been created, and the imperialists have not been stopped from violating them.

World public opinion has an ever stronger effect on the formation and conduct of a policy of blocking war. The peoples of many countries are much more active in the world arena, forcing the states to take the voice of the masses into account. "Now," noted Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, "the human factor is moving to the political level not as a remote and more or less spontaneous result of the life and activity of the masses and their intentions. It is exploding directly into world affairs."

Today there is every reason to look to the future with optimism, for the direct influence of the broad masses on world politics will transform it toward more restraint, wisdom and stability. In particular, the peoples are ever more decisively rejecting the concept of "nuclear deterrence," put forth by the aggressive imperialist circles, as false, dangerous and immoral. Public diplomacy is playing an ever greater role in solving the tasks of blocking war.

The organizational mechanism for regulating military and political relations among states occupies a special place in the development of the economic, political, legal, cultural-moral and scientific foundations for strengthening peace and blocking war. It has the decisive role in the creation and maintenance of a new international order, which reduces, and then completely eliminates the possibility of unleashing aggressive wars. Progressive scholars note the emergence of a new phenomenon—strengthening of the conscious regulation of states in the international arena by peaceful processes and behavior—which is expressed in the rapid development of international organizations (global and regional), and in more active coordination of the interests of sovereign countries.

Global and regional international organizations for maintaining peace and blocking war are being created on the basis of agreements among members of the world community. Their decisions are mandatory for all organization members. Such organizations have powers that are close in their essence to those of governments and states, based on the voluntary agreement of their members.

Today a farflung system of general-purpose international, intergovernmental organizations has taken shape and is developing, among which the United Nations, which includes a large number of specialized institutions, has been called upon to play a most important role. A historic purpose of the UN is to head up the building of an all-encompassing system of international security. The embryo of the new political thinking and of an intelligent approach to world affairs is found in the very fact that this organization has been created.

The new political thinking presumes that peace should be ensured exclusively by the United Nations, on the basis of strict observance of the principles and postulates of its Charter. The UN Charter anticipates everything necessary for mankind to live and solve its problems

without war. It was emphasized at the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference that "ensuring the security of states will shift more and more from the sphere of the correlation of military capabilities, to the sphere of political interaction and strict fulfillment of international obligations, and an all-encompassing system of international security will take shape, mainly through increasing the role and effectiveness of the United Nations." This organization is called upon to be the regulator of international processes, and it is to supersede attempts by the West to regulate them by force.

Unfortunately, the unconstructive policy of the United States and its allies substantially weakens the peacemaking potential of the UN. Through the fault of the United States and its NATO partners, many constructive decisions by the United Nations, including Security Council resolutions, which are mandatory, are not being fulfilled. And, their implementation could substantially improve the situation in the Middle East and other regions. The Americans frequently hamper the working out of effective solutions at UN sessions. For example, through the fault of the United States, approval of the final documents on disarmament at the 3rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1988 was disrupted. It opposed the creation of UN naval forces to maintain order in the Persian Gulf, provisions on preventing the militarization of space, and the ideas of creating "peace zones" and "nuclear-free zones," in particular in the Middle East. And it follows from this that, against the will of the world community, Washington plans to place weapons in space, and is contributing to the maintaining of tension and continuation of regional conflicts. Repeatedly the United States, along with its allies, has bypassed the Security Council and created armed forces under the UN flag, for the purpose of giving legitimacy to armed aggression and involving obedient countries in it (the aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1950-1953, against the Congo in 1960, etc.). Aggressive imperialist circles hamper the creation of a mechanism for blocking war, and the normal work of its elements.

The Soviet Union favors increasing the role of the UN in all aspects of ensuring worldwide security. For this purpose, it proposes that new international mechanisms be created within its framework, which will contribute to preventing the militarization of space, and monitor the observance of treaties in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, and the fulfillment of agreements on eliminating conflicts and crisis situations.

An integrated political mechanism that would make it possible to block war is still in the initial stage of creation and development, although many of its elements have long been in operation, but with far from the degree of effectiveness that would have a decisive effect on military and political processes and events. The existing elements of such a mechanism thus far interact with one another poorly, and in a number of instances exist in isolation. However, the instinct for self-preservation of

mankind will serve as an ever increasing incentive to unite the efforts of all peoples and states in building this mechanism. A bumpy and difficult path lies ahead in the struggle to overcome the profound and complex contradictions that tear apart the modern world. A reliable political mechanism for blocking war is the foundation of security, and of defending the freedom and sovereignty of our people and of mankind as a whole.

International organizations of the socialist states, as well as of the liberated countries, are an important element of the political mechanism for blocking war. Most important is the Warsaw Treaty Organization and its Political Consultative Committee, which are working out the most burning problems of reducing military danger, affirming trust between states of opposing social systems, and carrying out real disarmament.

The purely military factor of blocking war must not be underestimated in the process of creating guarantees of universal security and peace. It includes strategic military parity between socialism and imperialism on a steadily declining level; international detente; affirmation of trust in the military field; the defensive thrust of the military doctrine and of the organizational development of armed forces; the reducing of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and their complete elimination; the readiness and ability of peace-loving states to repulse any aggression; the reliable defense of socialism as a bulwark of peace and security of the peoples; and the use of UN armed forces, allotted by member countries at the disposal of the Security Council, when necessary, to maintain security.

Strategic military parity still remains the main obstacle in the path of aggressors unleashing a new war. The defense might of socialism fulfills a blocking role with respect to sources of wars and military conflicts by: a) their solely defensive purpose (lack of intention to attack anyone or threaten anyone by force); b) their example of using military resources with maximum caution (rejection of first use of nuclear weapons and of initiating a conventional or nuclear war); c) their readiness, together with the opposing side, to transition to non-offensive military structures and weapons levels (to give up the status of a nuclear power simultaneously with others who possess such weapons, to mutual reduction of conventional weapons, acceptance of non-offensive doctrines, and maintaining armed forces at a level of intelligent sufficiency); d) their shifting the center of gravity to political (non-military) means of ensuring security and defense, extending glasnost and openness in military affairs, and developing of a dialog in the military field; e) their ability and readiness to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor; f) and their assistance, on the basis of the UN Charter, to peoples and countries who are subjected to aggressive attack.

The defense might of socialism, in combination with active foreign policy actions, has more than once forced the aggressors, either to give up their predatory designs,

or even to cease aggressive actions already begun. In a number of crisis situations after 1945, only the fear of a crushing retaliatory strike restrained the United States from unleashing war. The failure of Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956, for the purpose of eliminating its progressive regime, can serve as a graphic example. At that time the USSR gave an unambiguous warning about its resolve to use every means to halt the aggression, and, through its active actions in the world arena and in the UN, was able to achieve the international isolation of the aggressors and halt the war.

It should be noted that in the postwar period instances of the effective use of UN armed forces to prevent or eliminate conflict have occurred repeatedly: in Cyprus in 1964, the Middle East to restrain Israel in 1973, etc.

Today, when a political mechanism for giving forewarning and preventing military conflicts and wars is not yet sufficiently effective, the defense might of socialism has the decisive role in restraining aggressors and maintaining security and peace.

The military resources of the countries of the socialist community serve the policy of maintaining and strengthening peace, and reinforcing political (non-military) means of ensuring security. Needless to say, this not only does not reduce, but to the contrary increases the importance of constant combat readiness of the troops and naval forces, of military training, deep ideological conviction, and thorough moral-political and psychological preparation of the soldiers for waging decisive combat operations, and for self-discipline and discipline in the subunits and units. Restructuring in our armed forces, in all of its parameters, is called upon to move the army and navy to a qualitatively new level. The 19th CPSU All-Union Conference gave precise instructions: from now on all defense organizational development is to be oriented primarily toward qualitative parameters, both with respect to equipment and military science, and to the composition of the armed forces. Guaranteeing the reliable security of the Soviet state and its allies, it is to be carried out in strict accordance with our defensive doctrine.

The restructuring of military-political relationships between states of opposing social systems, which is called upon to ensure international detente, trust in the military field, and the adoption of defensive doctrines by all, is called upon to play a special role in the creation of a mechanism for blocking wars and conflicts. Only in recent years has a dialog in the military field begun. Twice meetings between the USSR Minister of Defense, and the U. S. Secretary of Defense have been held, in Bern and in Moscow. At the invitation of Adm Crowe, chairman of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July of this year MSU S. Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, USSR Armed Forces, and USSR first deputy minister of

defense, held talks in Washington. More and more businesslike contacts are being established between lower ranking representatives of the Soviet and American armed forces.

Of course, the most reliable guarantee of blocking war is reduction of weapons to the minimum, and then total disarmament. But, enroute to this, step-by-step measures are important. As is known, a program for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe was put forth and augmented at conferences of the PKK [Political Consultative Committee] in Budapest (1986) and Berlin (1987). At the July 1988 meeting in Warsaw, its participants posed a number of fundamental new issues. They believe that the final objective of the first stage of negotiations should be the achievement of approximately equal (balanced) collective numerical levels of armed forces and quantity of conventional weapons for the states in the two military and political alliances—the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The balanced levels would be lower than those now existing on either side. This would create a foundation so that, in the second stage, the armed forces of each side would be reduced by approximately 25 percent (by about 500,000 men), with their organic weapons. Further reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons would be carried out in the third stage, and the armed forces of both sides would become strictly defensive in nature.

An integral part of the process of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, as has been noted in a statement made by Warsaw Treaty Organization member states, would be measures to reduce and eliminate the danger of a surprise attack. A PKK conference, held to determine correlations of forces and reveal disbalances and asymmetries in armed forces and conventional arms, proposed that corresponding initial data necessary for negotiations be exchanged.

An understanding among states on reaching a political settlement of crisis situations is an essential element in preventing and stopping nuclear conflict. Today a direct telephone link exists between the heads of state of the USSR and United States. In 1987 nuclear risk reduction centers were created in Moscow and Washington for the operational transmission of military-political information to one another on actions that could be incorrectly interrupted by the other side, and serve as a cause of heightening the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union is also proposing that a multilateral center for reducing military danger be created at the UN, and that direct communications be established between the UN headquarters and the capitals of the permanent members of the Security Council and the chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, and that a mechanism be developed for broad international monitoring of the fulfillment of an agreement for reducing international tension, limiting arms, and controlling the military situation in areas of conflict.

For the purposes of separating the forces of the warring sides, observing the cease fire, and implementing a truce agreement, the USSR proposes that the institution of UN military observers and armed forces be used more widely to maintain peace. It is proposed that means of peacefully settling disputes and disagreements among states be used more widely at all stages of a conflict, and that proposals be made to assist in blocking conflicts that arise and achieving a cease fire.

The socialist countries are moving actively along the path of creating a mechanism for preventing regional crises and conflicts. At the Berlin international meeting for a nuclear-free zone in July 1988, the GDR delegation proposed that a "hotline" between Prague, Berlin, and Bonn be used as a mechanism for stabilizing the situation on the boundary lines between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, and that a permanent confidence-building center, provided with appropriate equipment, be organized.

A fundamental strengthening and extension of cooperation among states in rooting out international terrorism, which has become one of the terrible calamities of the end of the 20th century, is extremely important. In the past 10 years more than 5,000 armed terrorist acts have been carried out, which threatened peace in a number of volatile regions. The majority of them are prepared by the intelligence services of the United States, Israel and the other imperialist states. To combat this evil, the USSR proposes that a special system be created within the framework of the UN—an international tribunal for investigating acts of international terrorism, inspection groups, etc.

Certain favorable tendencies are characteristic of today's international situation. However, as the Warsaw PKK conference noted, the situation in the world remains complex and contradictory, and the sources of tension and wars, and danger of a nuclear conflagration, have not disappeared. There is one way out of this situation—to bring into action all the elements of a political mechanism for blocking war, and to seek peace stubbornly and persistently, based on the principles of mutual equal security, a democratic society, and broad and equal cooperation.

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General Kirshin Stresses Non-Military Aspects of Security

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[Article by Maj Gen Yuriy Yakovlevich Kirshin, doctor of philosophical sciences, deputy chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Military History Institute: "Policy and Military Strategy in the Nuclear Age"]

[Text] The question of the correlation of policy in general with its aspect oriented toward the waging of wars and questions of security and military strategy—the

theory and practice of preparation of the country and the armed forces for war and the planning and organization of strategic operations and war as a whole—has throughout the time of the class-based society been at the center of the attention of politicians, military leaders, philosophers, historians and military theoreticians. And this is natural since the course and outcome of wars, the political map of the planet and the fate of states and coalitions have largely depended on how it was decided.

In the nuclear age interest in this problem has grown even more and become appreciably more intense. The threat of the destruction of civilization and the exacerbation of global problems are leading to revolutionary and evolutionary changes in the policy of states, parties and social movements. Economic and sociopolitical processes and the appearance of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction and also modern conventional weapons have modified the military strategy of the socialist, capitalist and developing states. And this has led to fundamental changes and fundamentally new trends, which, together with the action of common regularities, are characterized by asynchronism and specifics conditioned by the type of state and its affiliation to this socioeconomic formation or the other.

Granted all the complexity and, at times, contradictoriness of the relationship of policy and military strategy, the determining role belongs to policy. The latter exerts the decisive influence on all components of military strategy, which ensues from the class content of policy and the political nature of war. Military strategy is a means of policy, which is subordinate to it and serves it. Policy directs the development of military strategy and sets it assignments. The political leadership provides military strategy with the forces and resources for waging war and creates for it favorable foreign policy conditions. Therefore if policy influences strategy negatively, it is not the determining influence of policy but policy itself which should be blamed for this since an explanation of both skillful and bad strategy is to be found in its content and nature.

Policy's decisive role in respect of strategy was manifested particularly graphically in the signing between the USSR and the United States of the INF Treaty and the efforts pertaining to the elaboration of a joint draft treaty on the reduction in and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

At the same time military strategy, despite its subordinate role, influences, in turn, the content and nature and scale of policy. The degree of this influence depends on many economic, sociopolitical and military-technical factors.

Paradox of Strength

Nuclear strategy from the viewpoint of the classical purpose of military strategy has ceased to be a rational, constructive means of policy. It has lost its main property—the capacity for winning a war. Military strategy as

a means of policy at the present and foreseeable level of S&T progress has reached its historical limit. In the past the political ends of war frequently exceeded the available possibilities of weapons and their quantity and quality and military strategy as a whole. Now, on the contrary, political ends cannot be realized by military means since the use of nuclear weapons would exceed the most global political ends. The possibilities of nuclear strategy have outgrown the most fantastic designs of presidents, premiers and military leaders.

There is one further fact testifying that nuclear strategy prevents the achievement of political ends and the winning of a war. The Chernobyl accident showed that the threat engendered by nuclear energy does not recognize national borders and front lines. Given the use of nuclear weapons, there would be a mortal danger both for one's own forces and for one's own population. Paradoxical, but a fact: one's own security cannot be guaranteed even given surprise aggression.

The world has become so uniform and close that a world nuclear war has become an anachronism. It has dialectically rejected itself as a means of achieving political ends. This is a fundamentally new phenomenon in the correlation of policy and military strategy.

The development of military technology has led to the point where even nonnuclear war on the territory of industrially developed countries cannot be an efficient means of policy. Take, for example, Europe, where approximately 200 nuclear power station units and a large number of powerful chemical plants are located. For this reason even nonnuclear war on the continent would make it unsuitable for life.

Mistakes in policy have always been difficult to rectify even by its most outstanding representatives. "A mistake on the strategic map of the size of 1 centimeter," F. Engels wrote, "could develop on the battlefield into a million lives of soldiers and thousands of square kilometers of lost territory."¹ At the same time in the past political mistakes connected with the unleashing of wars could, for all that, be somehow rectified and the negative consequences reduced in the future by more prudent policy. In a nuclear war this would be impossible. The more powerful the weapons, the more dangerous and irreparable the miscalculations also.

At the present time mistakes of the political and strategic leadership could lead to the destruction of all of mankind. For this reason there is an immeasurable increase in the responsibility of policy in respect of the use of military strategy as a means of achieving its ends. This is the novelty of the dialectic of policy and military strategy. An increase in nuclear potential and the creation of new means of weapons of mass destruction have become politically and strategically meaningless.

At the present time we are observing directly a historical paradox: states' nuclear strategy has become politically impotent. Given the existence of nuclear strategy, the paradox of forces has become a universal phenomenon. Military power is insufficient for important victories in local wars also. Political results do not correspond to the power of military strategy. In the past the impotence of military power was experienced by individual states and, sometimes, coalitions. A new trend in the "policy—military strategy" system is operating at the present time—the impotence of military power is being experienced by the capitalist world as a whole.

What do rightwing-conservative circles associated with the military-industrial complex see as the way out of the nuclear deadlock? How to once again make military strategy—both nuclear and traditional, classical—an efficient means of policy?

As distinct from the model of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world advanced by the Warsaw Pact, the NATO political and strategic leadership adheres to the model of "armed nuclear peace," "nuclear deterrence" doctrine and modernization and retroarmament concepts. It hopes to find a way out of the current situation on the paths of a further buildup of strategic offensive nuclear forces, the elaboration of new types of nuclear munitions, the development of conventional means of warfare, the creation of the "low-intensity conflicts" concept and so forth. They (sic) are placing special hopes in the strategic use of space. The "star wars" program is an attempt to emerge from the "nuclear deadlock," convert military strategy into an efficient means of policy and find a way of fighting a victorious war. However, as this program is implemented, there will be an increase not only in the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war but an increase in difficulties in the pursuit of the policy of peaceful coexistence, even if leadership is assumed by the most farsighted, sober-minded politicians.

As already said, a nonnuclear war in Europe would be disastrous for the continent and for the population of the capitalist and socialist countries. The new concepts aimed at fighting wars by conventional means and the transfer of technological rivalry to the sphere of nonnuclear arms are reckless also, therefore.

We are witnessing in general a crisis of war as a means of policy. After all, imperialism has with the aid of local wars not succeeded in restoring capitalism in a single socialist country and was unable to rescue the colonial system. Capitalism's "second wind" connected with relative internal, social stability and successes in S&T progress and the economy are by no means the result of policy's use of military strategy as its basic means.

In the not-too-distant past even in the capitalist countries, and in the socialist countries too sometimes, problems of policy and strategy were resolved by a small circle of people, and military-strategic thinking was basically the province of politicians and strategists. At the present time

we are seeing the shoots and the birth of a new trend—the working masses and peace forces aspiring to influence the policy of aggressive circles are participating increasingly actively in questions of the relationship of policy and strategy. Levers, albeit inadequate as yet, but permitting a limitation of the possibilities of aggressive policy in the use of strategy in its own interests, are appearing to the people's masses and public opinion. The determining role of policy in relation to nuclear strategy in questions of the preservation and safeguarding of peace is possible on condition that the broadest strata of the population of all states participate in its formation and implementation and if the foreign policy sphere and international relations as a whole are democratized. "Public, people's diplomacy," M.S. Gorbachev writes, "the appeal directly to the people, is becoming a normal means of interstate communication."

Under the conditions of glasnost and democratization in the Soviet Union new opportunities are emerging for the functioning of people's diplomacy. The interests of survival require the introduction to the formulation of our state's foreign and defense policy of the broadest circles of the Soviet public and the formation of a mechanism which would permit the adjustment of foreign and defense policy and the introduction thereto of alternative ideas and recommendations. The enlistment in the shaping of foreign policy and military policy issues of specialists and experts from research establishments, VUZ's, state and elective authorities and representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces would make it possible in a comparatively short time to eliminate the stagnant phenomena in the development of the theory and practice of foreign policy and international relations and the teaching on war and peace, enhance the efficiency of foreign and defense policy and raise considerably their moral authority and confidence in them overseas.

Security Is Born in Dialogue

The threat of the destruction of civilization required recognition of the unity of mankind as a race and led to the formation of the concept of an integral, interrelated world. For this reason in the current situation the relationship of policy and military strategy must adequately reflect this new phenomenon.

In the current situation the system of the relationship of policy and strategy may no longer be exclusive and isolated, it must be inseparably connected with and ensue from the concept of an integral, interrelated world. The internationalization of social life requires and permits an increase not only in the degree and scale of manageability of processes but also of the relationship of the policy and strategy of contending countries.

The interests of survival have taken the problem of the connection of policy and strategy beyond the framework of individual states and alliances to the level of all

mankind, which has reached the point where the interconnection and coordination of the policy and strategy of states of different types, those in conflict primarily, have become a historical inevitability. Problems of world, regional and interstate politics and nuclear strategy are bound in a tight knot. For this reason the interests of survival and the preservation of civilization require the linkage and coordination even of the policy and military strategy of some states with the policy and military strategy of others and the solution of problems not only on a national but also on a world scale, in the interconnection of states of the whole world. It is very important here to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers. Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine are structured on the basis of the concept of an integral world.

There is a profound objective connection between the interaction of policy and strategy in individual states and the state of international relations on a world scale. On the one hand, never in the past did the situation in our world as a whole and world politics depend thus on the relationship of policy and strategy in individual states, on the other, never did the relationship of policy and strategy in individual states depend to such an extent on world politics. For this reason a new relationship has arisen: world politics—national policy and the military strategy of individual states, both nuclear and nonnuclear.

Countries of the world community are interdependent, and for this reason it is most expedient to tackle questions of the relationship of policy and strategy by way of a comparison of military doctrines, where the connection is expressed in the most concentrated form. It is particularly important to link questions of the policy and strategy of the nuclear states, which it is most convenient to do by way of a comparison of the doctrines of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the USSR and the United States for the purpose of imparting to them an exclusively defensive thrust.

When formulating military doctrines in the interests of both aggression and defense in the past, the contending states took account primarily of one another's economic and, particularly, military possibilities. This is what is done now also. However, in the interests of the survival of mankind this approach is now a narrow one. The nuclear age demands a comparison of military doctrines primarily for the purpose of preventing nuclear and conventional wars.

A comparison of military doctrines could lead to effective practical steps if it is comprehensive and if it covers both the political and military-technical aspect. The subject of dialogue could be sources of military danger and wars in the world and regionally; the essence and political content of modern wars and their sociopolitical nature; the military power of the state, the structure and organizational development of the armed forces, the instruction and training of the personnel, deployment of

troops and naval forces and states' military presence; the military-strategic nature of possible wars and the methods of fighting them, the correlation of offensive and defensive operations and so forth.

The Warsaw Pact states have proposed to the NATO countries a comparison of military doctrines. However, their proposal has as yet to meet with due understanding. In our opinion, it is expedient in the current situation, using various forms, to stimulate this dialogue to an even greater extent not only at the level of political scientists, philosophers and retired generals but also at the state level. Productive meetings of the top military leaders of the USSR and the United States have already been held.

For the increased efficiency of the process of comparison of military doctrines it is essential that the appropriate procedure be formulated within the framework of military science.

However, a comparison of military doctrines does not signify the adoption in military organizational development of the strategic principles of the other party and symmetrical responses to the actions of the opposite sides. The Soviet Union, for example, has not accepted the "limited nuclear war" concept, which the United States has imposed. In the 1950's the Soviet Union did not begin to compete with the United States in the creation and development of strategic bomber aircraft, although the United States had many air bases on the perimeter of USSR territory, which afforded it great strategic superiority. The Soviet Union found an asymmetrical approach—it began to develop ICBM's. At the present time, if the U.S. Administration embarks on the path of creation of the SDI, the response will be asymmetrical also.

The relationship of the "policy—military strategy" system at the world, regional and multistate levels by no means signifies that it may be taken to absurd lengths, as certain Western ideologists are doing in respect of regional conflicts. They see all local wars and armed conflicts through the prism of the interaction of policy and strategy between the USSR and the United States. The Soviet Union believes that regional conflicts must not be made an arena of the confrontation of the two systems and the leading states of these systems.

And, further. Certain local wars in particularly tense regions, where many contradictions of the era are intertwined, could grow into a world nuclear war. Conflicts in the developing countries are highly explosive, and their danger cannot be underestimated. Given the existence of acute conflicts, there can be neither stable regional nor world peace, even given a reduction and limitation of the arms of the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO. For this reason constant attention to regional conflicts is essential—not only to those which

exist but also to those regions where they might arise. The threat of nuclear war and commonsense demand a limitation of the political and strategic goals of the combatants in local wars.

The nuclear age dictates the need for the utmost deliberation when decisions concerning wars and armed conflicts are being made. The criterion of a decision on political questions in respect of local wars should be the survival of mankind. The interests of the salvation of civilization demand mastery of the art of behaving with restraint on the world scene and that one live in civilized manner. The policy adopted in Afghanistan of national reconciliation has shown the way to neutralize the conflict. The policy of national reconciliation is aimed at settlement of the situation concerning Afghanistan, an end to the civil war, the establishment peace throughout the country's territory and the formation of a coalition government.

Great attention is being paid in the Soviet Union to the formulation of political and strategic measures which could localize regional conflicts and prevent the growth of local wars into a world nuclear war. Our country is proposing to the great powers, many of which are involved to this extent or the other in regional conflicts, certain "rules of behavior". Specifically, renunciation of the use of the conflicts to strengthen one's military presence in countries and regions, a reduction in military positions overseas (reduction in the military presence outside of national borders, limitation of naval activity), renunciation of one-sided actions in conflict situations, renunciation of the artificial linkage of conflict situations, a strengthening of the international-legal basis of nuclear nonproliferation and a reduction in supplies of weapons to the areas of conflict situations.

Nor can we remain silent about the following important fact. UN armed forces could perform an incomparably more effective role in the neutralization of local wars and conflicts and the prevention of their growth into a world war. Thus the Soviet Union has proposed the creation of a UN naval force for ensuring freedom of shipping in the Persian Gulf zone. A need for the precise definition of the place and role of the UN military mechanism in the settlement of regional conflicts and the methods of the use of armed forces in them and for the elaboration of the problem of the correlation and relationship of world politics and the policy of individual states and alliances with the nascent international military strategy arises. This also is a new phenomenon in the relationship of policy and military strategy.

From the Positions of Survival

In the not-too-distant past even states could provide for their security by way of an increase in the possibilities of military strategy. The traditional criteria of security were economic and military potentials, the use of weapons and deterrence. Certain countries were secure as a consequence of the fact that they were located on the other

side of the ocean, far from militarily powerful states, and as a consequence of a struggle between strong states, to which the weak were at times of no concern. Small states frequently endeavored to strengthen their security by way of affiliation with military-political alliances.

At the present time these questions have to be resolved in a fundamentally different manner. The nature of nuclear weapons is such that one's security cannot be ensured outside of the international context, without regard for the security of other countries. So unity has become indivisible, one-sided security is no longer possible, even if a state is on the "periphery" of the planet. The affiliation of militarily weak states to military-political blocs weakens their security, as a rule, and upsets strategic stability. An increase in the military power of one state inevitably leads to an increase in the military power of another, to an arms race and to a disturbance of strategic stability. This is a new phenomenon in both policy and military strategy. The political and strategic leadership must, if it wishes to ensure its country's security, think about international security and tackle questions of the interaction of policy and military strategy in an international dimension, within the framework of regional and world politics. Having formulated the fundamentals of an all-embracing system of international security and the principles of military-strategic balance and defensive sufficiency, at the 27th congress our party found a new approach to the correlation of policy and military strategy.

Absolute security for one side is possible only given the absolute security of the other. The interests of survival dictate that when deciding on problems of policy and strategy the United States and the USSR and NATO and the Warsaw Pact proceed from, first, nondisruption of military-strategic parity and, second, a constant reduction in the possibilities of strategy and the role of "purely" military factors. The nuclear situation demands that both parties provide for the security not only of themselves and their allies but also joint security. It is Soviet military doctrine which is spearheaded at ensuring not only national but also general security. Such a military doctrine is historically unprecedented.

Nuclear weapons have properties preventing a single state having a military strategy which provides for security and the most powerful defenses only by military-technical means. The tendency here is as follows: in conflict settlement the significance of policy is growing, and the role of military strategy is diminishing. The security of a state cannot be ensured primarily without political means, and this is a manifestation of the primacy of policy in relation to military strategy. Unfortunately, in the not-too-distant past we sometimes reduced the problem of safeguarding security merely to the military sphere and underestimated the relationship of disarmament and the clash of political interests of the USSR and the West in the "third world" and their involvement in local crises. Foreign policy activity was not always geared to the removal of the political causes of contradictions.

A further trend operates at the present time: policy and strategy and problems of international security are inseparably connected with global problems, with the global situation on the planet. Global problems—the elimination of poverty and disease, conquest of space, development of the riches of the sea bed and protection of the environment—cannot be tackled without a sharp reduction in the possibilities of military strategy and without a halt to the arms race and a limitation of the colossal military spending. On the other hand, the intensification of global problems could lead to an exacerbation of states' military-political contradictions, to local wars and ultimately to the unleashing of a world nuclear war.

Military strategy has always influenced policy. But in the nuclear age this influence has under the impact of military-technical factors increased to such an extent that the degree of relative independence of military strategy has increased by an order of magnitude and that there could be a narrowing of the sphere of political decisions, particularly in respect of the unleashing of war. Under current conditions military strategy, while always occupying a subordinate position, could to an ever increasing extent slip out of the control of policy. It might seem odd, but in the nuclear age war could begin even without the intervention of the political leadership. As a consequence of the particular features of nuclear weapons and the increase in the quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals the probability of their unsanctioned use exists. This probability will increase even more if the SDI program is realized. After all, the "star wars" weapons will essentially themselves make the decisions on their use. In the past, in the prenuclear age, a world war could not erupt as a consequence of the unsanctioned use of weapons—at the present time it could. The threat of the accidental start of a nuclear war increases on account of the inadequacy of the control system and in connection with the lessening of control over nuclear weapons and the increase in the forward-based forces and weapons. The rate of development of military technology is so high that it is leaving the peoples, states and politicians increasingly less time to recognize the real danger and is reducing mankind's possibilities of halting the slide toward the nuclear abyss. Granted the growing degree of independence of strategy, it is nonetheless amenable to political pressure. Nonetheless, it is important that even more dependable political control be established over nuclear strategy in all countries. In this connection military strategy and the military-technical sciences are confronted with the task of preventing the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

The independence of strategy could also be manifested in the fact that the accidental outbreak of nuclear war cannot be ruled out. The world situation could assume a nature whereby it was no longer dependent on politicians and was captive to chance.

Politicians and strategists do not rule out a war of the nuclear powers using conventional weapons. A situation could take shape in such a war where as a consequence of

great human losses and losses of important territory the political and strategic leadership would not be in a position to halt the escalation of the armed conflict, and the war could become nuclear—strategy could slip from beneath the leadership and control of policy. There would be a nuclear cataclysm, which would as a whole be a continuation of policy, but directly, a continuation of military strategy.

The possibilities of nuclear strategy, economic expenditure on the creation of nuclear weapons and the duration of the timescale of their creation at times impose on policy a particular logic of action. The U.S. president, let us assume, has approved the creation of new nuclear weapon models. The entire cycle of their creation could take 4-8 years. A new president could in this time have occupied the White House, and under him the weapons which had been built would largely influence his policy even in the event of his being an opponent of them.

And, further. The increased degree of independence of military strategy has been reflected in the arms race and the modernization of weapons, which at certain stages of their dynamics slip from beneath the control of policy to a certain extent. In striving for military-strategic parity we did not always in the past make use of the possibilities of safeguarding the state's security by political means and, as a result, allowed ourselves to be pulled into an arms race, which could not have failed to have been reflected in the country's socioeconomic development and its international position.

The General Mankind Factor in the Relationship of Policy and Strategy

In the nuclear age there has been an increase in the relationship of policy and military strategy in the role of the general mankind factor, which has essentially taken pride of place. An analysis of the relationship of policy and strategy may be undertaken only with regard for the dialectics of the general mankind and the class factor. *Primacy in questions of policy and strategy belongs henceforward to interests common to all mankind.*

Both social systems are incorporated to an ever increasing extent in processes of a world nature and scale. Mankind is recognizing increasingly clearly his unity and his common fate. Human activity is assuming a planetary nature, and the internationalization of world development is increasing.

The main task confronting mankind is the problem of survival and the salvation of civilization. For this reason the "policy—military strategy" problem cannot be tackled only from the standpoints of the policy of the contending states, from the standpoints of the ruling classes therein. The class interests of the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO are diametrically opposite. However, the common goal—survival—is making itself felt with ever increasing certainty. In the current situation it should be a question

not of the fate of individual classes and states but of the fate of mankind, the concept of an interdependent, integral world and recognition of the growing significance of problems common to all mankind. At the present time the oppressed classes, while struggling against the oppressors, cannot fail to make their interests and political programs commensurate with the problem of survival. If it is a question of war, then, however difficult this is in the social and psychological plane, it is necessary to rise above the interests of the class struggle in order to save civilization.

The concept of the priority of values common to all mankind makes it possible to have done with the severance from the rules of morality not only of policy but of military strategy also, make the basis of policy moral and ethical standards common to all mankind, build a stronger bridge between policy and morality and military strategy and morality and form a mechanism of the pressure of international morality on policy and military strategy. It is time, finally, to have done with the detachment of policy from the standards of morality common to all mankind. The difficult problem of preventing a world nuclear war cannot be tackled either outside of planetary thinking or outside of planetary action. Only mankind is capable of this historic task.

Socialism ensures the unity of policy and military strategy and their correspondence and coordination and also the harmonious combination of military strategy and arms control.

At the same time the foreign policy of the Soviet state is not free of mistakes either. M.S. Gorbachev writes in his book "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World": I am far from idealizing each step of Soviet foreign policy in recent decades. There have been mistakes also."

Mistakes were made in policy and military strategy and also in their interconnection. We were unable to take full advantage of the smashing of fascist Germany to halt the political efforts of the organizers of the "cold war". We did not always respond to the provocative actions of imperialism with adequate efforts of military strategy. Use was not always made of the opportunities for safeguarding our security by political means, and we allowed ourselves to be dragged into an arms race.

Policy was confronted with tasks which did not correspond to our state's actual domestic and international possibilities. An absolute was made at times in foreign policy of its military means, particularly in policy pertaining to the developing countries, where we assumed the role of military guarantor of certain countries. Our military assistance helped them embark on the path of a socialist orientation or development, but subsequently we were unable to render the necessary economic assistance when they found themselves in a difficult position.

In the 1970's the Soviet Union scored big successes in foreign policy. The Helsinki process began to develop, the ABM Treaty was signed and so forth. The Vietnamese people were rendered great assistance in the struggle for their liberation. At the same time a lack of coordination between tasks of domestic and foreign policy was sometimes allowed to occur. In the 1970's the interests of the country's development required radical economic reform and the sociopolitical strengthening of the Soviet Union—the citadel of peace and socialism. We, however, sometimes pursued essentially trifling gains in the developing world. We sometimes forgot that socialism must prove its advantages by domestic successes in the political, social, economic and spiritual spheres, but in no event by military means. "Gratifying" others in the nuclear age threatens global dangers.

As a whole, despite the mistakes which were made, Soviet policy never betrayed its arterial direction—safeguarding peace and the peoples' security. Also in keeping with its peace-loving policy is one of its means—military strategy, whose theoretical and practical aspect is subordinated to the prevention of nuclear war. The Soviet Union has nuclear weapons, but our state's policy is aimed at no first use of nuclear weapons. The decision concerning no first use of nuclear weapons has been an indispensable and obligatory part of Soviet military strategy.

In the prenuclear era Soviet military doctrine was defensive in the political plane—the Soviet Union had no intention of being the first to start a war against anybody. However, the military-technical part of military doctrine and military strategy were offensive. The offensive was considered the main type of military operations.

After the political leadership of the Soviet Union had concluded that nuclear war could not be a rational means of policy, that it could have neither victors nor vanquished and that nuclear war would end in the destruction of civilization, the military-technical part of Soviet military doctrine and military strategy was given a strictly defensive nature. Soviet military strategy became nonoffensive and proceeds from the fact that an offensive in the nuclear age cannot be the main type of combat operations. The nonoffensive strategy is realized in strategic planning, in training and education and in the tightening of control measures aimed at precluding the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. The development of the Soviet Armed Forces in the current situation does not exceed the limits of essential defense sufficiency. The numerical composition of the army and navy, the amount of military equipment and the manpower acquisition system are subordinated merely to the interests of defense of the socialist fatherland and our allies.

The peaceable nature of the Soviet Union's policy and the unity and concord of policy and military strategy are attested by its proposals and practical measures in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction. Our country does not aspire to achieve military-strategic superiority

to the United States, nor will it permit superiority to itself. In accordance with the peace-loving policy, the Soviet Armed Forces are a means of preventing the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. Prevention of a world nuclear war is their principal function at the present time.

Military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States at this historical stage is undoubtedly a stabilizing political factor. Maintaining a balance of military forces at the lowest possible level would correspond to the interests of peace to the greatest extent. However, the arms race could lead to a situation where even military-strategic parity ceases to be a factor of strategic stabilization. The problem of preventing a world nuclear war cannot be tackled within the framework of commensuration of the military-strategic possibilities of the United States and the USSR. This is primarily a political task. And the primacy of policy over military strategy is manifested here also.

It should be borne in mind that, lowering the nuclear parity, a situation could be created where there is an increased likelihood of war with conventional weapons. For this reason it is essential to seek military balance at a lower level in conventional arms also.

Military-strategic parity is not the ultimate goal of the policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries; it is an important frontier and essential condition in the policy of creation of an all-embracing system of international security.

If the United States and other Western countries consent only to partial measures in the creation of an all-embracing system of international security and partial measures in the sphere of political and even military detente, the Soviet Armed Forces must, as before, at all stages of the formation of this system be ready to repulse aggression. In the military-political situation which is taking shape the increased combat readiness of the armed forces is a measured continuous process which must accompany all steps in arms reduction and limitation, even if the military-strategic confrontation exists at a comparatively low level.

Footnotes

1. F. Engels, "Selected Military Works," Moscow, 1976, p 216.

2. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World," Moscow, 1988, p 164.

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USA Institute Official on Non-Military Aspects of Security 52000545

[Editorial report] Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 1, for January 1989 publishes on pages 40-51 a 5,000-word article by Igor Malashenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and academic secretary of the U.S. and Canadian Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, entitled "Non-Military Aspects of Security." Malashenko urges a "new international security system... to bind together both military and political, economic and humanitarian factors." He argues that the existence of nuclear weapons requires rethinking traditional concepts of national and state security and of military balance of power. For instance, he notes the example of China, which did not feel the need to strive for nuclear parity with the two superpowers. He notes the paradox that large investments in defense during the 1970's and 1980's left countries feeling less secure. He criticizes the traditional Soviet striving for "full independence from the external—which was almost synonymous with hostile—environment," and urges greater "interdependence" among the countries of the world. He stresses the fundamental importance of a healthy economy to national security. Malashenko also discusses psychological factors in confidence-building; he notes that perestroika and glasnost have increased Western confidence in the Soviet Union, but states that the Soviet Union must make further improvements in opening itself up to the outside world.

S. iet Secrecy, 'Bluffs' Seen Partly To Blame for Arms Race

52000015 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 11, Nov 88 pp 23-27

[Article by Igor Malashenko: "The Stronger the Better? (From Arms Race History)"]

[Text] Today, when we begin to openly discuss our own problems in the sphere of foreign and military policy, we inevitably run into the most general questions—for example, are we interested to be strong militarily? Must we strive to be stronger than our "potential enemy"? Do we want to seem stronger than we are in reality?

All of us without hesitation will answer "yes" on the first question. This is right because we live in the world in which we live. This world is too far from benevolent utopia. In the past, however, it seemed unquestionable that it would be good not only to be strong, but much stronger than the opponents: such "margin of safety" guaranteed the greater security. The situation changed in the missile-nuclear age when confronting societies became defenseless in the face of nuclear threat: both sides can infinitely increase their might, but because of this the security of each side vanishes like a shagreen leather. Therefore, it is not only useless today to be stronger than the enemy, but in fact, we should care for its security as of our own.

On the other side, is it bad to seem stronger than you are? If you are weak, it may be the only defense from the encroachment from the stronger, and if your strength is respected now that means it will be respected even more. In our history we more than once paid great prices for our weakness. So many times and so much that we had apparently developed in ourselves the desire to be and to seem as strong as possible.

It is easy to understand this. World War II exhausted us utterly. The United States, our ally turned to be an enemy, on the contrary, greatly increased its might. Washington became a monopolist of a new "super-weapon," and the threat of a nuclear strike against the USSR was quite real. In addition, the Americans falsified the scope of their atomic arsenal. In July 1946, they had nine atomic bombs, a year later 30, in July 1948—fifty. All the bombs were stored disassembled, they can be assembled by a group of specialists of 39 men during more than two days (they had only three groups in 1948). In 1948, the Americans had only 30 bombers B-29 re-equipped for delivery of atomic weapons.

In other words, it wasn't an easy thing for Washington to carry out an "atomic blitz," the threat of which it so cunningly used to bluff. In 1948, during the so-called "Berlin blockade," 60 bombers B-29 were transferred from the USA to Great Britain, which according to the "leakage" in the press, had atomic weapons on board. In fact, they were even not equipped for carrying atomic bombs and their delivery was a sheer bluff. We know this today while forty years ago such provocations were regarded seriously, of course.

From the moment of origin of atomic weapons, the USA tried by all means to propagate (and even to exaggerate) their enormous destructive power. In the summer of 1946 Washington was worried by the fact that the atomic bomb tests on the atoll Bikini under the code-name "Able" was not very successful: "Only" several ships were sunk from the number of those which had to demonstrate the power of a new weapon. By the way, observers from many countries were present during that test. That is why, urgently, three weeks later, they carried out a more impressive demonstration—the explosion of "Baker" which "rehabilitated" the "absolute weapon."

After the Soviet Union eliminated the American atomic monopoly, Washington set the course for the speedy design of a "superbomb"—thermonuclear one. The USA considered that the most intimidating effect must produce the enormous, compared even with atomic weapons, power of the "Super." Therefore, the creators of "Mike" (code-name of the first nuclear device) headed by E. Teller, tried to do everything to make it as powerful as possible. They achieved the goal—the strength of the explosion was about 10 megatons.

However, the United States retained for some time the monopoly on the means of delivery of such weapons even after the Soviet Union created atomic weapons and

later nuclear weapons: having encircled the USSR with the ring of bases, and produced strategic bombers, they remained invulnerable and inaccessible. The scope of American nuclear arsenal was growing fastly: in 1955 the USA had already about two thousand atomic bombs. In these conditions Washington did not stint for threats in the spirit of "mass retribution." Even after the Soviet Union was able at last to "reach" the US territory, Washington continued to use its nuclear superiority for blackmail. What is more, when Washington officially recognized that there was a parity between the USSR and the USA, Americans continued to invent more and more doctrines and concepts the point of which was that they knew how to wage and win nuclear war. If there is no winner in nuclear war then the USA can be superior in the arms race. We must say, they demonstrated quite convincingly its determination: the palm in creation of new systems of strategic weapons belongs to the USA except for some cases.

Undoubtedly, we were being provoked. Sometimes—unsuccessfully: Americans, for example, failed to involve us into the rivalry in the field of strategic aviation, we chose an asymmetric answer—development of IBM. At the same time, noted Mikhail Gorbachev: "Our reaction to provocative actions of imperialism was not always adequate."

At the end of the 40s—the beginning of the 50s, when we were in a very difficult condition, our maximum "closeness" played a certain positive role in military sphere: very often Americans considered that we were stronger than we were really (the less developed means of reconnaissance was the reason, too). Under conditions of American monopoly on nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, the exaggerated appreciation of Soviet military power was an important argument of preventing Washington's hawks from the temptation of delivering a "crashing strike" against the Soviet Union.

True, at that time our secrecy cost us some inconveniences—it's unlikely, for example, that trust in us increased by the fact that it was Washington that was the first to announce about the test of the first Soviet atomic bomb.

Only real strengthening of our strategic potential could guarantee our security. Due to production of nuclear armaments and modern means of their delivery, the Soviet Union already at the second half of the 50s was able to strengthen considerably its might. In spite of the fact that the USA greatly outnumbered us in nuclear weapons, Washington was forced to consider seriously the capability of Soviet retaliatory strike in case of war, therefore the USA displayed more realism in nuclear problems.

At the same time we could not refrain from the temptation to "overact" Americans on trifles and present ourselves as strong as possible. For example, though the United States left the Soviet Union behind in creating

nuclear weapons, for a number of years we pretended to be the first in this sphere having forgotten it was unwise to be proud of such records. We tried to surpass the USA in the power of a tested thermonuclear charge having brought it to 50 megatons (in the beginning of the 60s statements were made that the USSR had also 100 megaton bomb). "Taking into consideration that the Soviet Union created hydrogen weapons earlier than the USA, and the main thing, the USA has no superpower thermonuclear charges of tens of millions of tons while the Soviet Union has, we consider that we have unquestionable superiority over the Western bloc"—these are the words from the work "Military Strategy" edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovsky in 1962.

In the middle of the 50s, the USA developed a noisy campaign concerning the so-called "gap in bombers." It was asserted that the Soviet Union was much ahead of the United States in strategic aviation and that very soon it would achieve a decisive superiority. As a "pretext" for the organizers of the ballyhoo was taken the military-aviation parade in Moscow in the summer of 1955 at which Soviet long-range bombers were shown. In fact, it revealed the interests of the US Air Force which applied the utmost efforts to push through its gigantic programme for building up bomber aviation.

Were such exaggerations of Soviet Union's strategic power in its interests? At the time we apparently believed in it. In 1957 Soviet science and technology gained a historic result—Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (IBM) was successfully tested and the first sputnik was launched. That event greatly shocked the United States which used to look contemptuously at "backward Russia." Literally in a day we became immeasurably stronger than before. And not only because we created a powerful weapon, which irrevocably put an end to the invulnerability of the USA—we showed not only military but also economic and technological power and vitality of our society.

Nevertheless, the real achievements did not satisfy Nikita Khrushchev. Soon he declared about serial production of IBM in the Soviet Union. In 1959 he said that only one of Soviet factories produced 250 missiles with nuclear warheads. Perhaps many Soviet people, who well remembered the result of weakness, drew a sigh of relief at that time. But on the other side of the Atlantic these statements brought about frenzied efforts of the arms race supporters. A new hysterical campaign began—at that time about a US "missile gap"—which was used as a cover for a massive programme of building up of American IBMs. Meanwhile, in 1960 we had only a handful of strategic launchers and less than 500 nuclear warheads, while the number of US strategic launchers was nearing two thousand with over four and a half thousand nuclear warheads. In spite of our "closeness," Washington already knew well the real alignment of forces due to U-2 spy-aircraft (which made regular flights since 1956), and since 1961, due to spy satellites. Some [of] our statements were taken as bluff.

For many years the American nuclear superiority was so great that we could not refrain from attempts to "get revenge" at least by rhetoric. In 1963 the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Rodion Malinovsky said: "I say quite seriously, against 344 missiles with which Mr. MacNamara threatens us, we will retaliate with a simultaneous strike of several times more missiles equipped with so powerful nuclear charges which in fact will wipe out all objects, political and administrative centres of the USA, completely destroy the countries which allowed construction of American military bases on their territories..." Did we seem stronger than we were in fact because of such statements? Yes, in the eyes of those who did not know the real picture. Did that correspond to our interests? Hardly—long-term—fear generated by such methods was used by Washington for mobilizing American society, for "substantiation" of its huge steps in the arms race, for spiralling ever new military programmes. As a result, threat to our security was increasing.

Of course, today we do not like to mention many things, therefore there appeared "white spots" in history of the arms race as well as in our history, in general. But the United States, however, likes to speak about them, quite often irrelevantly. Well, we have no monopoly of infallibility. In the first years of the atomic era our traditional secrecy served us to a certain extent a factor of our security, but later—in combination with rather shortsighted rhetoric—it was used by our opponents for an unimpeded fanning of a campaign of "Soviet threat." The desire to seem as strong as possible, which could be justified at first, brought us to the fact that we began to consider ourselves too weak against the background of the widely-circulated evaluations of our might.

Meanwhile, since the Soviet Union built up the first strategic bombers, all American administrations could not think seriously about employment of nuclear weapons for achieving their political aims. The threat to use nuclear weapons implies that you are ready to resign yourself to the thought of an "acceptable damage"—but what level of victims among Americans could be considered "acceptable" by a US president? Even at the mid-50s the thoughts that even though in spite of all the power of American nuclear strike against the USSR, a single Soviet bomber could break through, say, to New York and drop its deadly load, was enough to cool the hottest heads in Washington. In 1961 American military calculated the possible losses in case of war against the USSR (if the United States would deliver the first strike) as ten million people, at the same time the losses among Soviet population already in the first hours of the war would amount to about 140 million people. Kennedy's administration, however, were quick to understand that in spite of great difference in those figures, ten million Americans could not be considered an "acceptable" value for achieving real political aims.

Despite this, Americans for many years bluffed in fact frightening us with ever more horrible scenarios of nuclear war. The main thing, American strategists tried

to persuade us that such war could be controlled and limited, that it could be put into some frames and limited by an "acceptable" level. The Soviet Union never recognized this thus irritating Washington greatly: the perspective of a limited nuclear war has long ago been used for nuclear blackmail and reasonings about a possible "victory."

Alas, sometimes the desire to look as strong as possible let us down. In 1962 Marshall Radion Malinovsky, the USSR Minister of Defense, said: "The superiority and just aims of our Armed Forces give us a firm confidence that in future war, if it will be unleashed by imperialists, whatever an all-embracing, destructive and annihilating it will be, it will be we, defenders of socialist achievements and defenders of the great cause of communism, who will win."

Of course, such statements can be regarded as excessive rhetoric of the end of the 50s-beginning of the 60s. However, much later, at the end of 1979, "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" stated that "The Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries in this case will have certain advantages compared with imperialist countries brought about by the just aims of war, more advanced character of their social and state system. This creates them objective possibilities for victory." American strategists did not fail to use this statement for substantiation of one of the most dismal strategic documents—Presidential Directive N. 59 worked out by the Carter administration.

Naturally, we have understood and learned much. We know that there will be no winner in nuclear war. We understand that we must not resort to rhetoric which provides our opponents with a ground to shout about "Soviet threat" and building up of nuclear arsenals. However now the organizers of the arms race can often act without our help: an "image of enemy," the relentless aggressive Soviet Union has long ago been established in the West and lives its own life, so to speak. Due to its existence, it is possible to present as truth the fantastic data about the scope of Soviet military construction and combat capabilities of new Soviet weapons. What could we set against this flow of misinformation under the conditions of traditional "secrecy" of information about our defense potential? And the only thing left to us was to wonder why traditional stereotypes live so long.

Step by step, glasnost penetrated into military sphere. But this happens so slowly as if we still consider that uncertainty in relation to our military capabilities serves our interests better than the level of openness which has long ago become a norm in the majority of countries. I think the matter is not only in our desire to seem as strong as possible to deceive our enemies. For many of us to seem stronger means to seem better. Apparently we spent very much time to reach this, exaggerating our achievements in the most diverse spheres. Isn't it high time to renounce this? Honestly, we have many things to be proud of without exaggerations.

Peace Movement Seen as Force for Internal Political Change

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[Article by Gleb Pavlovskiy: "Peace in the World and in the USSR: Spiritual Movement and Real Movement"]

[Text] [<]ix "The personal views of a man about the philosophy of peacemaking." The subtitle could be different to emphasize the paradox and unexpectedness of the author's conclusions. The trouble is that it is probably early yet to speak about a peacemaking philosophy or concept, more or less established. In an interview to our correspondent, published in issue No 11, 1988, Vladimir Orel, First Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, raising a number of new and fundamental questions on the purpose and activity of the Soviet Peace Committee, urged the "XX Century and Peace" magazine to start a public discussion, keeping in mind that the conference of the Soviet peace movement is not far off. In fact, the magazine has been conducting such a discussion from month to month, and for quite a long time. We hope that the materials mentioned here will give an additional impetus to the creative participation of our readers in the search for a real and effective peace all over the world and in our own country.

There is some thing about the West that gives you no peace. I would like to have the same in the USSR. But they won't give us this thing. And it is impossible to import it. It can't be presented by the most generous Western billionaire or by the political movement most friendly disposed towards our country. Is it possible to copy this thing? Yes, but this will be to no avail. It can't even be got hold of, although it has an exact location.

This thing is located in Europe, in the wonderful country of Spain, not far from its capital, Madrid, and is called Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen). It is a common graveyard where those killed in the civil war—Leftists and Rightists—are all buried. These people took up arms to fight their brothers, and if they didn't kill their brother, it was only because he killed first.

The common graveyard of fascists and anti-fascists! The most outstanding anti-communist of our century—Francisco Franco lies there among communists and his comrades-in-arms, among heroes and the meanest minions and hangmen who fell victims, and the victims who didn't have time to become hangmen. There is nothing in common between those lying there, nothing they could have agreed upon if they were to start talking again. They have all interfered passionately and irreconcilably into Spanish history and all are dead.

So why are they lying together?

For them nothing, but for those living it has one meaning: civil war has ended and peace has set in.

Every person can have enemies but people have no "enemies of the people." There is terrorism and murders may take place, but nobody is looking around in search of "renegades." There is poverty, hopeless poverty and there are people who stand to gain from poverty but it harbours neither "intrigues of dark forces" nor the "machinations of foreign secret services." People are full of vice everywhere, but nobody will start accusing a Russian or a Frenchman of Spanish vices. (By the way, this is the most important sign of a people safe for their neighbours—when nobody is interested in the ethnic origin of a villain or in the patronymic of a fool: all are our folk!...)

This also means that Spain, where peace has set in, must have become an open social universe. In this world there are advanced and developing countries, national discord and class struggle, there are archaic antiquity, modernization and vague future.

This future, too, may have everything: who knows the future? there may be bad government, dangerous policies, crises, military bases....

Except one thing: the people can no longer curse their own diversity and tear themselves to pieces. They can no longer lose the trust of mankind, and horrify neighbours to such an extent that they start making arrangements behind their back and arm in fear of this people. They are alien but not of foreign origin. They are incapable, having lost common sense because of the irresistible horror, of attacking neighbours.

Such people, peacefully coexisting at home, can also peacefully coexist with other peoples. Only the people who have settled themselves "in a non-violent and nuclear-free world" can be an honest partner in the future universal non-violent and nuclear-free world of the Delhi Declaration.

In this case, the peaceful movement of such a people may take the next step—to become anti-war and ecological. Only if the established inner world is shaken by global disasters will man, reconciled with himself, feel responsible for the earth. Freedom established inside the country is protected by nuclear arsenals, that is, by the threat of general destruction, and the conscience of the free cannot become reconciled with this, even if there is no visible alternative as yet. And the countries whose customs, languages, self-government and character have been returned, are concerned not with an ecological crisis "in general" but with the fate of one particular stream, a particular village churchyard—a feature on their face.

But let's get back home, to the USSR. The revolution has gone down in the annals of history: there are practically no surviving participants in it. They have left us with their enmity, their passions. We can only guess their feelings, or read about them, but we do not feel ourselves.

Seventy years have passed since the time when somewhere in a basement revolutionaries shot the tsar and his whole family. It is 50 years since the time when revolutionaries were being shot in other basements, alternately with those who were shooting them. 43 years of Victory and 35 years since the death of the Tyrant.

And peace? Has eternal civic peace come to Russia?

True, the Law on the protection of peace was adopted long ago. Invented by Stalin, it "acts" invisibly up to this day, with no consequences and no passions. But our attitude to "enemies" is quite different—even to dead ones, without our knowing them at all. Only the meaning, the image of the enemy changes, but the search for it becomes more indefatigable and the nose for it sharper. The generalized "enemy of the people," officially withdrawn from use, has engendered a host of successors: "renegade," "revisionist," "people who sold themselves to the secret services," "dissident," "rabid anti-Soviet" and so on.

You could never utter a word about burying the cavalymen of Budyonny and the soldiers of Kolchak side by side. And how should they be buried—under a cross or a star...?

As innocents?—a lie. As guilty of our shame?—another lie. (There have been even more extreme pronouncements: sort out the "innocent" from the "guilty" and bury corpses separately, the first under a Memorial, the others in a pit.... In terms of blasphemy, this idea comes close to the desecration of a temple—looking for enemies even among corpses, in common pits, in the earth, where not only shoulder-straps but even mixed up bones cannot be found!

So far, it seems, our minds are formed in such a way that no sooner they let out one enemy they immediately need another. And if they don't find it they become sad, pine away and "lose ideological conviction." Such a spiritual state can be projected on the famous painting by Salvador Dali, showing a creature torturing itself. Even this will seem to us a realistic popular print.

The past century asked its main question without malicious intent: whose fault is it? The co-author of this question, Alexander Herzen, was one of the first to warn against trusting "revolutionary dentists." But, despite the warnings, all the mass ideologies of the century now drawing to its close were built on the idea of finding personal "culprits" for the evil of history and imperfection of social structures. These ideologies engendered mass-scale investigative consciousness. "Still preserved are exponents of bourgeois views and bourgeois morals"—dying Stalin inserted into the newspaper announcement of 1952 concerning the case of "doctors-killers—live people, covert enemies of our people." He underscored the word: live....

Live people—covert enemies. By the end of the 1930s, this monstrous equation of the civil war period, developing into omnicide, became established in Eurasia and turned politics into an absurd mincing-machine for peoples.

And, wherever this thought has not been cursed or condemned, wherever it is admitted in political practice, the search for criminal classes, national enemies and renegades—the “fifth column” which the investigative consciousness is always craving for, may resume there at any moment—from the top or from the bottom. Even when uttering the word “perestroika” such a mind believes: there are enemies! Secret, anonymous, terrible...! They are like us, they speak like we do, they are live people, they must be got rid of....

...A bureaucrat or a mason, a conservative or a Stalinist, a Russian or a Jew—the investigative consciousness clings to any type, any name, any difference to put into action its only working programme: the state of emergency. This consciousness regards peace as a natural disaster, normal life—as a catastrophe. The key word of this totalitarian programme is: *enemy*. Hence, progress (since investigative consciousness always stands for “progress”) is conceived as general mobilization and tireless struggle against innumerable enemies. Progress is like a continuous social pogrom....

It must be admitted that this is sore consciousness. We are sick with contempt for our diversity. Perestroika is not simply a revolutionary process, it is a therapeutic one. Any therapist will proceed from the simple fact that, apart from the “correct” and “incorrect” life of the sick—alive but sick—organism, it has only one real alternative: death. Mankind has this alternative and the country has it too. From the therapist’s point of view the threat of such an alternative equals the difference between two others. The future of a recovering person may be dazzling or modest: the main thing is that this future should exist.

Proceeding from the sober consciousness of this reality, perestroika inevitably resumes, and partly engenders the movement for peace in the USSR. The paramount problem here is that of preserving human life in its freedom, diversity and fullness. Problems must be posed and solved, but not by repressing the personality, or at any risk to its safety. There must be no blood. Only a non-violent world can become a nuclear-free world—and only in this sequence, not the other way round. But, for us in the USSR, this road is just beginning, and we are on the threshold only of its first, inner stage; that of becoming a peace in our own country, live in a non-violent community, with morally justified order, but not paralysed by force and fear.

Peace in the country, order and civic peace come first, then as a result—the struggle for “world peace.”

“Peace to the world” is now not about the whole globe but about us in the USSR: to our restless federal world a real peaceful order. Spiritually, that old inner war has never ceased, it is still smouldering in souls, suddenly breaking loose from under the quiet ashes with flames of enmity and violence. And the Soviet peace movement is, above all, a movement to stop the state of civil war, whether under the name of “class” or “ideological struggle”—it’s all the same. Fighting against thoughts and ideas we fight against our late ancestors and are in eternal discord with our own brain. While war is being waged on the dead, the people’s intellect remains in the darkness and is ready for frenzied actions. And new victims among the living are likely.

Late in the 1980s the Soviet peace movement had a strange problem: it doubted its own existence. Among dozens of civic initiatives stimulated by perestroika there is nothing more evasive and problematic than the peace movement. Deprived of the religious impulses of Tolstoyism and generally without any kind of philosophy, it is also deprived of enthusiasm for negation, which is a usual thing for any informal movement irrespective of its stand. A Stalinist, “anti-bureaucrat,” regionalist or ecologist see clearly their opponents, whereas a Soviet “peace champion,” especially of an “anti-war” orientation, remains a secondary figure, imitating the actions of Western pacifism engendered by the cultural environment and the problems which are more or less speculative for us. The desperate struggle of local ecologists and national-cultural groups, the modest work of lone persons who have devoted themselves to charity, the feverish attempts of certain politicians and administrators to check the avalanche of problems without losing their warm house and bread and milk for their children, do not find a single spiritual dominating idea, and risk dissolving in a current of social enmity. An invaluable threat: it has already happened in the past. Who remembers today the heroic struggle of Vladimir Korolenko and Maksimilian Voloshin on two fronts: against red and white terror? Who was educated by the messages of the old man Kropotkin to the Council of People’s Commissars, and by the desperate entreaties of Maxim Gorky in “The Inopportune.”

The peace movement in the USSR was twice broken off, slandered and twice forgotten: at first by punishment, in the 1920s-1930s, which put an end to alternative military service, Tolstoyist, vegetarian communes, the political Red Cross society, local and district communities, and for a second time, artificially implanted by the end of the 1940s, in the form of official government pacifism, the so-called “struggle against warmongers,” i.e., the “struggle for peace” all over the world—except the USSR.

For a Soviet person, official pacifism at best confirmed his reluctance to fight once again and to see a repetition of the war calamities, still fresh in his memory. Nobody wanted a war against America, but anyone would have been surprised to hear that peace means something

different from the way of life which he usually led. A peaceful life for a Soviet person of the late Stalinist epoch—before Chernobyl—was simply the life he lived, life without a war: a worker had his life, the oppressed village—its life, prisoners had their own as did those who protected them. All this was embraced by the official concept of the peaceful life of the Soviet people.

Never before did people talk and sing so much about peace as in the 1970s. "If only there were no wars"—the sarcastic password of those years, involuntarily turned into funny story, and there was no war, indeed, and no peace either. This is because all forms of peaceful human life were undermined, emasculated and limited, and those who spoke about this had a limited choice: be arrested or flee the country.

Then the idea, unprecedented in Russia, entered some unknown person's head: let's accuse the intelligentsia lying! The words "slander of the system" were specially invented and introduced into the Criminal Code. It was lie, preceded only by the Inquisition, and unconscious and ideologically sacrilegious lie, especially loathsome. And a war broke out, a small internal war, a small victorious war which governments finding themselves in difficulty, like so much to wage. A war that lasted 20 years.

The Russians who "do not want a war," as it was sung in the well-known song, persecuted Galich for singing other songs, and those who sang together with him. But now the song of Galich "You dare to go into the square..." is sung at Komsomol meetings. But this song is about concrete people who came to Red Square on August 25, 1968 to prove, using the only means available, that they were not responsible for tanks going into Prague. The youth who really wanted peace and not only sang peace-loving songs ("Peace, we need peace to laugh...") read the novel by Pasternak and the annals of Solzhenitsyn 20 years ago, when these books were banned and when reading them was banned. They read the book banned by the government because they remembered from school that in the dispute between the government and literature in Russian the government was always wrong, and the poet was always right. And the war of the government writers is a civil war.

Having read "Dr. Zhivago" in the night, the contraband edition by Feltrinelli, with something of Platonov, Robert Orwell and Solzhenitsyn, they came into the square to preserve civic peace from arson. But other people who "did not want war," arrested and interrogated them.

Today it is easy to find out what the intellectuals were lying about: it's all in the newspapers. But there is another interesting point: not everything published today in the appears was yesterday the persecuted truth. For example, nobody knew that simultaneously with the World Forum of Peace in Moscow, there existed an underground concentration camp in Uzbekistan, with

concrete and steel chains, and a monument to Lenin standing on the ground above it. Adylov was torturing disagreeable people! It is very important to specify that not a single "liar" persecuted by the law in the 1970s, even the most embittered by falsehood and humiliation, reproached the "system" with anything like this.

This alone is enough to justify the complete rehabilitation of citizens condemned through the Inquisition and pseudojuridical procedure of the "struggle against dissidents" from 1965 to 1985. The demand for this rehabilitation is a natural, integral part of the Soviet peace movement's programme.

No, the Soviet people didn't want war when, at those shameful "meetings" on the occasion of the shooting down of the South Korean airliner, they "demonstrated" in support of the actions of the AA Defence Command. Nor did Americans, when they backed the President in a similar incident in the Persian Gulf—demonstrate to the world their inborn bloodthirstiness. But both acknowledged the reality which their politicians will have to deal with, in one way or another: spiritual unpreparedness for peace and unwillingness of war. The idea that peace is only the absence of war does not put the course of events under moral control. And this is a challenge to the peacemakers of 1980s-1990s: the lack of a genuine will for peace and without any war has engendered and will go on doing so without any bombs.

Today, peace is again becoming a deed in Russia.

When, at its spring session, the Soviet Peace Committee adopted the course of internal reconciliation and cooperation with informal peacemaking initiatives in the country, although with some hesitation—this was not only a comprehensive striving of an old institution to find its place in the changed reality, but also a sign of the thawing of the will for civic peace. The forms which decorative pacifism like so much: round-table conferences, seminars, walks, people's diplomacy—will be of use but not so much with overseas pacifists and humane millionaires, as with our own stubborn fellows!

Peacemakers are needed more in the country than outside.

For example, where were our peacemakers during the days in Sumgait: at a seminar in Venice, at a festival in Cannes? ...As soon as the news about this, alas, key event of the year was heard, the intelligentsia—ethnographers, sociopsychologists, linguists—whose number is so big when they have to receive a Western delegation, or when they have a chance to fly to the West, didn't turn up at the Transcaucasia. Why? In addition, from the West—India, Northern Ireland and the USA, you can bring experience, recommendations and advice to solve your problems, but not suitcases, or caps with hearts on them, and the valuable discovery that "the enemies are also people like ourselves!" (a thought which has never prevented a single war, act of violence or pogrom).

...I would like to imagine the impossible—maybe Dali could paint such a picture. A world congress of cookery specialists in Ethiopia perishing from hunger. A congress of aesthetes in Pnom Penh. Or a festival of doctors-pacifists in Chernobyl, with rock concerts, dinners and shooting for newsreel. And how many of such things happen because of moral ambiguity, under the name of the "struggle against war," in our country, which is not rich, but ulcerated by the past and recent events, where blood was shed again.

How many antiwar actions and get-togethers in the spirit of people's diplomacy have been after Chernobyl: thousand, ten thousand? If ever someone decides to write in the future about people's diplomacy in the Chernobyl era, the writer will recall not the walks, not the picnics of pacifists on the grass but D. Gale, and rightly so, because the others are meaningless. For peace, only those three, five, 50 or however many saved by Gale, a man without a Soviet passport, who cured the victims of the erroneous policy of the enemy-state, have meaning here.

And all our congresses and peace-loving kisses are only for this one man to save him from being seized and tortured, to save him from ever fearing this. If the anti-war Soviet intelligentsia could sacrifice—how awful—their summer leave and dachas, and struggle for peace in the Transcaucasia, perhaps there would have been no "airport crisis" in Yerevan, no shots would have been fired in September. After all, isn't the chance of saving at least the life of one of our countrymen—in a peaceful country and in peacetime—worth all the millions of the Peace Fund, the efforts of all staff members of the Soviet Peace Committee?

The peace movement in the USSR must learn to be stubborn. It will not even get off to a start until it becomes used to speaking the unpleasant truth to authorities and to the people—a deep-rooted habit in the experience of violence, in the demands for "just" violence, and in the dreams about noble and faultless violence.

The majority is never for peace in the exact Russian sense of this word, which means a comfortable and safe universe. Most people, naturally, prefer the conditions of peace to conditions of war—but are almost never ready for peace as spiritual work. Peace is the spiritual thirst for reality, diversity and freedom, and the will to non-violence as the condition of all this. To deaden this thirst is just as impossible as to implant it in a person who does not have it. Therefore, the struggle for peace is always the dialogue of the minority yearning for peace with the majority thirsting only for advantages of the absence of war. The peace movement, not being the majority, must become a voice heard from everywhere: smooth, honest, absolutely in tune and independent. The actions of politicians and the responses of the people will often ignore this voice, and then peacemakers must go into

action, if they exist in the country. They do exist, since peace—let's repeat Spinoza, and with pleasure—"is not the absence of war, but a virtue stemming from the firmness of the spirit."

Soviet Scientists' Committee Book on SDI Reviewed

118160004n Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 11, Nov 88 pp 137-139

[A. Savelyev review headlined "The SDI Program: Dangers and Dead Ends" of the book "SOI—amerikanskaya programma 'zvezdnykh voya' (Sbornik obzorno-analiticheskikh materialov o tekhniko-ekonomicheskikh i voyenno-politicheskikh aspektakh SOI)" (SDI—The American 'Star Wars' Program (Collection of Survey and Analytical Materials on SDI's Technical-Economic and Military-Political Aspects)) by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Danger. Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canadian Studies Institute, 1987, 360 pages.]

[Text] The book offered the readers' attention by a group of associates of the USSR Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute and United States and Canada Institute, published under the aegis of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Danger, is devoted to an examination of a pressing problem of contemporary international relations—the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program which the United States has been implementing since 1983. This program has, as the authors observe, become at the present time "a central component of the United States' foreign and military policy" (p 3). It may be added to this that it has also become a basic issue of the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms, threatening to become a most serious obstacle in the way of the achievement of such an agreement.

The vast majority of Soviet publications on SDI subject matter concentrates attention on the military-strategic and political aspect of the question. Without a most serious technical-economic analysis it is impossible, in our view, to discuss in any way objectively all other aspects of the realization of this program either. A comprehensive analysis of the latter is a distinguishing feature of this study. It is this approach which enables the authors to conclude that "the accomplishment of the task of the creation of dependable strategic defenses requires major changes, possibly, fundamentally new ideas simultaneously in practically all fields of engineering and technology on which such a defense system could be based" (p 110).

The survey of the technical-economic and military-political state of realization of the SDI program and the extensive selection of Western material accompanied by commentary from our specialists enables the reader to assess independently the degree of probability of the

creation of a broad-based ABM system with space-based components and also the level of the possible dangers which ensue from the American plans to deploy such a system.

It is important to note that the book examines the question of the offensive potential of space-based systems. The point being that the sphere of so-called "space strike weapons" (*udarnyye kosmicheskiye vooruzheniya*) has been studied insufficiently fully in Soviet studies of subject matter of the military use of space, although a number of interesting works on this topic has already been published. Different authors provide a different interpretation of these systems, but more often than not provide none at all. Some include in the space strike weapons category all systems capable of destroying objects in space and delivering strikes from space against earth; others understand by space strike weapons only arms placed in orbit and capable of delivering strikes against ground, air and space facilities for the purpose of weakening the retaliatory strike of the victim of the aggression. In the first case people speak of a wide spectrum of arms, including space-based ASAT and antimissile arms; in the second, only of a fundamentally new weapon, whose development is not directly a part of the mission of realization of the SDI and which could only be a product of the further evolution of space-based ABM defenses.

Nor does the work in question provide an interpretation of the "space strike weapons" concept, but it is important that it examines specifically the following questions: how and in what capacity could the weapons systems being developed within the SDI framework be used and how realistic are the prospects of the appearance of these systems in the immediate future. The authors' conclusion is quite unequivocal: we may speak at the present time merely of the potential for the creation of new-generation ASAT systems (p 160), but by no means of weapons capable of attacking from space a wide spectrum of targets on earth and in the atmosphere.

This conclusion is, it would seem, very fundamental inasmuch as there are in broad strata of the Soviet public certain apprehensions in connection with the fact that the United States could in the very near future create and deploy new space-based arms systems capable of launching surprise attacks on ground targets. If there are circles in the United States urging the development of such weapons, tremendous difficulties of a technical and economic nature stand in the way here, not to mention the political inhibitors of both a domestic and international-legal nature.

As far as the economic aspects of the creation and deployment of new ABM systems of the United States are concerned, these questions are illustrated in detail in the second chapter of the study, and specific information concerning the resources already spent on individual SDI programs and also assessments of future expenditure on the final development and deployment of these systems is adduced. The authors cite an interesting fact:

the U.S. Administration is at the present time evading in every way possible estimates of the full cost of this program, which, a number of independent experts calculates, fluctuates from \$500 billion to \$1.5 trillion (p 195). Were the Washington leadership to acknowledge in one way or another the justice of these calculations, it could hardly enhance the popularity of SDI with the American taxpayer. In addition, even the commanders of individual arms of the services would hardly consent to a sharp reallocation of military appropriations in favor of the SDI, which would be inevitable in the event of the adoption of a decision on the engineering development and deployment of U.S. ABM systems.

Such apprehensions are being expressed even now by certain representatives of the U.S. military department. All this is reflected in the wide-ranging debate under way in the country concerning various aspects of implementation of the "strategic defense initiative," a survey of which is adduced in the third, final, chapter of the book.

The detailed analysis of the evolution of the debate between the opponents and supporters of the SDI is of great interest for the reader. The authors adduce not only the arguments against continuation of the work on this program but also those, frequently quite serious, in support of its further development employed by the U.S. Administration and the defenders of R. Reagan's "initiative". An important point of the debate, in our view, is the question of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, which is without a time limit, in the light of the attempts to impose on Congress and the public its so-called "broad" interpretation.

The book says frankly that in the course of the work on projects within the SDI framework considerable vagueness arises as to which specific action should come under the restrictions of this treaty, and which, not, on which the SDI supporters are attempting to speculate. In particular, this applies to "dual-purpose" hardware—ASAT weapons—whose development, testing and deployment are not restricted by any agreements. This subterfuge makes it possible to perform work within the framework of the creation of ABM defense. It is rightly noted that "the most difficult problem in an interpretation of the treaty's provisions concerns the so-called 'dual-purpose hardware,' which could be used in an ABM system" (p 286).

The authors conclude that the continuation of the SDI program and possible U.S. attempts to create and deploy new antimissile systems (whether limited or broad-based defense) create a real danger of the parties being pulled into a "vicious circle" of the continuation and intensification even of the arms race (p 324). The USSR would be forced here to adopt certain countermeasures, which would reduce the efficiency of the ABM defenses, which, in turn, would stimulate continuation of the corresponding work in the United States. Thus there can be no question even of the parties' transition to "purely defensive" arms, which is today acknowledged by both the opponents and many supporters of the SDI. ABM

defenses may only be an addition to the existing arsenals of strategic arms, whose continued modernization and buildup is part of the administration's plans.

As a whole, the book in question creates the impression of a serious and in all respects useful work of great interest to both specialists and readers interested in this subject matter. At the same time a number of shortcomings cannot be overlooked. And the main one, in our view, is the fact that the authors frequently avoid expressing their own position concerning the prospects for the SDI. After all, it is this which is most pertinent from the viewpoint of the future not only of Soviet-American relations but also international politics in all its manifestations.

Certain conclusions of Western experts, who proceed from the fatal inevitability of continuation of the SDI in this form or the other, as, equally, the just as inevitable broad application of the results of the work pertaining to this program in many spheres of military organizational development (p 336), could have been disputed. We are today indeed observing an abrupt rise in the quality of many weapons systems at the disposal of the armies of the United States and the NATO countries. And the process of their improvement will in all probability continue in the future also. But the "strategic defense initiative" program should hardly be directly linked with S&T progress and the use of its results in the military sphere. The SDI itself was largely born of this progress, as, equally, of the long postwar confrontation of the USSR and the United States, the aggressive policy of imperialism and the stagnation phenomena in our society. Nor did these phenomena bypass the spheres of military development and international relations, which until recently existed independently, as it were, without an ostensible relationship.

And if it may be maintained that the process of the upgrading of arms in this form or the other will continue in the future also, regardless of realization of the SDI, the prospects of the American "initiative" will also depend to a considerable extent on the constructiveness of the foreign policy course of the USSR, a full consideration of current realities and practical realization of the proposition of the 27th CPSU Congress concerning a political solution of the problem of security. From this viewpoint the authors' concluding statement to the effect that "the Soviet people and the Communist Party depend on their armed forces, doing everything to strengthen them, and are sure that no aggressor could catch the USSR unawares" (p 342) sounds somewhat one-sided.

The SDI, like the majority of military programs of the United States and NATO, has been justified by fear of the USSR and the socialist countries. The removal of this argument by way of decisive transformations in our country's domestic and foreign policy, military included, could really contribute to a strengthening of trust and stability in the world and create the conditions wherein

the "star wars" program withers away for lack of need or becomes a program of peaceful and constructive cooperation between the two great powers and East and West as a whole.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988

Obstacles to Asian Disarmament Examined

Japanese View on Asian Disarmament
18070104 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 89 p 6

[Article Professor Hidejiro Kotani, Kyoto University, from the SANKEI SHIMBUN: "Toward Disarmament in Asia: View from the Japanese Islands"]

[Text] The program of unilateral arms reductions advanced by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev in his address at the U.N. General Assembly session on 7 December 1988 was met with approval, unlike the program for general and complete disarmament proposed in September 1959 by the late N. Khrushchev, first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which is being fulfilled "in an atmosphere of trust and efficiency," became the background for this Gorbachev program.

However, welcoming the decision on a unilateral reduction of Soviet Armed Forces, the U.S. secretary of state at the same time pointed out that even at the end of 1991, that is, when the general secretary's promises will be carried out, the East's armed forces in Europe will still surpass the West's armed forces, and the problem of the imbalance of forces will continue to remain. At a NATO Council session of ministers of foreign affairs, however, there was concern that the defensive plan of the West, based on a combination of nuclear weapons and conventional arms, is beginning to gradually collapse. In this regard, after Gorbachev's speech, participants of the meeting came out with specific proposals on negotiations with the East on questions of conventional arms reductions. The point of these proposals was for the East to reduce its conventional armed forces even more than Gorbachev proposed.

As far as disarmament in Asia is concerned, General Secretary Gorbachev's address only said that "during these 2 years we will also substantially reduce the grouping of armed forces in the Asian part of the country." The specific reference that a significant portion of the Soviet Armed Forces presently located in Mongolia would be withdrawn is linked to Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which is expected in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the hitches in settling the Afghanistan problem make it possible to understand why Gorbachev limited himself only to these proposals. However, based on the results of the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Japan and the Soviet Union and guided by

interests of Japan's security and ensuring peace in Asia, it must be recognized that an important task for Japan must be active assistance in creating an atmosphere in Japanese-Soviet relations that would favor developing a dialogue aimed, above all, at disarmament in Asia. You see, in the 21st century Japan will have an important role to play, I am convinced, in disarmament. This follows both from Gorbachev's statements in his speech at the United Nations and from the fact that in the 21st century, Japanese-Soviet relations, international ties between the countries of Asia, and the entire Pacific Ocean region will become the center of development of world events. Of course, questions associated with the forthcoming disarmament in Asia are questions affecting not only the mutual relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. These questions affect the interests of a large number of countries and are directly linked to questions being discussed within the framework of the United Nations.

In order to orient ourselves in the Dialogue concerning problems of disarmament in Asia, the following must be kept in mind.

First of all, the principle of "asymmetry" should be made clear. Having announced the unilateral reduction of its armed forces, the Soviet Union adopted precisely this principle, proposed earlier by the United States. It is natural that this same principle should also be applied to questions related to Japan. Speaking more concretely, this should involve withdrawing Soviet troops located on our northern territories. Since we support establishing our just sovereignty over the northern territories, it is quite natural that the principle of "asymmetry" should mean the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from the four islands. This withdrawal would also demonstrate the Soviet Union's readiness to proceed toward disarmament.

Of course, the withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces should not be linked to the location of our Self-Defense Forces on Hokkaido. In any event, if we are to be guided by Gorbachev's words about maintaining the USSR's defense capability "at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency," then the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should be improved even further. Why? Because it is apparent from a report by the magazine *NEWSWEEK* how successful the Soviet troop maneuvers were in which they practiced operations for landing on the island of Hokkaido. What is more, from sources connected with management of the national defense, it is known that the Soviet Union's Pacific Ocean Fleet, as before, is continuing to increase its might. Such a buildup of military might will result in the USSR having to make unilateral cuts again in the future. In this sense, the Soviet Union should reexamine its policy of increasing its arms in Asia, if only to avoid ahead of time the emergence in the future of those difficulties which it has encountered today.

Secondly, those nuclear armed forces of the Soviet Union which are trying to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into their own inviolable area must become a vitally important long-term objective of the disarmament policy in

Asia. This disarmament must include a reduction in USSR Air Forces in the Soviet Far East which cover the Sea of Okhotsk from the air. If the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union consider it necessary to reduce strategic nuclear weapons on a global scale, then as Pacific Ocean powers they must begin reducing strategic nuclear arms in this maritime region. In this regard, perhaps they should think about the idea of creating nuclear-free maritime zones both in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, involving in this matter the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as Japan and the two states on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, there may also emerge a need for creating a new system of security.

Soviet View on Asian Disarmament

18070104 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 89 p 6

[Article by I. Latyshev, doctor of historical sciences: "Through Joint Efforts: Logic of Common Sense"]

[Text] The article by the well-known expert on international affairs, Kyoto University Professor Hidejiro Kotani, attests to the great attention with which the Soviet Union's peace initiatives were received in Japan. Whether he wants to or not, the author must read between the lines that the Soviet Union's consistent course toward general disarmament and relaxation of tension has today become the axis of development of world events.

The author's opinions are typical, however, for the stand taken with respect to Soviet peace initiatives by leaders of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, as well as the military circles here and the right-wing press. This stand is two-faced: On the one hand, they express approval of all steps by the Soviet Union to reduce its armed forces. In particular, they approve of M.S. Gorbachev's plan to cut the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men and withdraw sizable military contingents from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia, not to mention the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan, entering its final stage.

On the other hand, however, the a deliberately incorrect notion is being suggested to the public that at this stage of developing international relations, disarmament should be not a common cause for all the major military powers of the world, but merely some unilateral responsibility of the Soviet Union. At the basis of this approach is the assertion that the military threat to peace throughout the world comes only from the Soviet Union and that the armed might of the United States and its allies poses no threat to peace. Overlooking the fact that today Japan ranks third in the world in level of military expenditures and that its armed forces have become one of the most battle-worthy armies of the capitalist world, supporters of this myth use it to justify the Japanese government's course toward a further buildup of the country's military might. One can clearly track in the author's arguments the well-known views of the leaders of Japan's national defense agency, who maintain that the Soviet Union's

peace initiatives and its concrete steps toward arms reductions should not be accompanied by corresponding reciprocal steps by Japan. Speaking out in favor of "improving Self-Defense Forces," the author justifies the further buildup of the country's armed forces by absurd fabrications about some military preparations by the Soviet Union in the Pacific Ocean, transparently alluding that they supposedly envision an invasion of Hokkaido.

Complaining about the absence of any mention in M.S. Gorbachev's speech about reducing the Soviet military potential in the Pacific Ocean area, Professor Kotani passes over in silence the fact that, in addition to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, there are large contingents of its military ally—the United States—located on its country's territory. They include not only 50,000 American soldiers, but also the U.S. 7th Fleet which consists of aircraft carriers with fighter-bombers on board, nuclear-powered submarines, and other warships armed with nuclear cruise missiles and other types of offensive weapons. Unlike the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet, which is based on our own territory in accordance with our country's defensive doctrine, the U.S. naval forces have been moved out to this area of the world far beyond their own borders.

It is significant, for example, that in the upcoming joint American and Japanese naval maneuvers in the area of the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan this fall, the U.S. military command will practice, as the same SANKEI SHIMBUN has already reported, operations to "put Kamchatka out of commission," "occupy the Kuril Islands," and "attack Primorye." To write about the Soviet Union under these circumstances as some source of "military threat" in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region and demand that it take unilateral steps toward disarmament is to go against truth and common sense.

Professor Kotani's unjustified attempt to consider the Kuril Islands as Japanese territory and in this regard to insist on the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from these four islands also cannot help but evoke in Soviet readers a legitimate feeling of protest. The bias of the author's opinions is particularly noticeable when, demanding the demilitarization of the Kuril Islands, at the same time, he considers it legitimate to continue to maintain the presence of four divisions and three brigades of Japanese Self-Defense Forces in direct proximity to Soviet borders, namely on the island of Hokkaido.

True, Professor Kotani's article does contain constructive ideas. In particular, his statements about the desirability of developing Soviet-Japanese dialogue and reaching a Soviet-American agreement not only on a global reduction of nuclear forces, but also on their reduction in the Pacific Ocean zone, as well as his appeal to turn the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk into "nuclear-free" zones based on creating a "new system of security." Sensible ideas, without a doubt. It is too bad that in expressing them, the author made no mention of the fact that the Soviet

government has on numerous occasions made this proposal to the U.S. and Japanese governments. Thus, in his address in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, M.S. Gorbachev informed the public that the Soviet Union would not in the future increase the amount of any nuclear weapons in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region and called upon the United States and other nuclear powers to follow the Soviet example. In that same speech, the Soviet leader proposed to the main naval powers of the region to begin mutual consultations on not building up their naval forces. What is more, it was proposed to those same powers in that same speech to begin on a multilateral basis discussion of the question of reducing military confrontation in the region where the seacoast of the USSR, the PRC, Japan, the DPRK and South Korea come close together in order to freeze naval and air forces at balanced reduced levels and also to limit their activities.

Unfortunately, so far there have been no positive responses to these concrete proposals.

Report on Destruction of SS-12s at Stankovo Belorussia

52000007 Minsk VECHERNIY MINSK in Russian
22 Aug 88 p 3

[Article by KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII correspondent V. Samoylov: "The Order: 'Destroy!'—Report From Missile Destruction Site"]

[Text] Two silver buttons on a panel of the same color surrounded by a thin border of red. Above them the brief word "Launch." Using both thumbs as the instructions required, I pushed them simultaneously. And... nothing happened—there was no flame from the nozzles, no takeoff of the missile, no "blossoming" of the nuclear "mushroom" igniting everything animate and inanimate many hundreds of kilometers away—nothing, precisely nothing happened.

And one thing had happened nonetheless: it seems I was the last person to push those terrible buttons, today as inoffensive as the doorbell of my apartment...

We went along a long row of blunt-nosed but in their own way elegant combat devices. And although reason knew, the heart refused to believe that on this comparatively small field, only about a few hundred square meters in all, was concentrated a firepower that surpassed by many times all of the weapons of death that had ever been used on the field of battle.

"May I?" I asked the captain accompanying me.

"Now you can," he took the hint.

We climbed on top of one of the launchers, then lowered ourselves into a cramped cab filled with dozens of instruments through an armored hatch. My past experience permitted me to guess the purpose of some, while others—and they were in the majority—bore within

them the secrecy of perfection, the terrible perfection of a weapon, to the altar of which mankind has always come as in no other realm, unfortunately bearing the achievements of its most leading minds.

The engine roared and the launcher came to life, ready to move forward.

"An excellent vehicle," said the captain, reclining in the seat in familiar fashion. "It can cover any bad road conditions, it swims like a fish. And its shoots..."

I could sense pride and even love for the weapon of his labor in his words, as it should be for any man who respects his work.

He was still young, this dark-haired and smiling captain, but in his whole life he had known no other craft, in seemingly endless training—day and night, winter and summer—seeking the complete unification of crew and machine, so that at the decisive moment—millions of people pray to their gods that it never come—he can execute the order...

Today he and his comrades have received a different order. An order that the whole world applauds—destroy the weapon.

"Aren't you sorry?" I unwillingly asked him.

"A little bit, to be honest," he said as he tapped the steering wheel a few times, "but it is necessary. It must stop sometime anyway..."

Stankovo. A small village located ten kilometers from the rayon center of Dzerzhinsk and fifty from Minsk, it was earlier known for the fact that the Pioneer-Hero Marat Kazey was born here, and perhaps for its century-old park on the banks of the Ussa River. Today Stankovo is marked on the political map of the world as the place where Soviet and American specialists in the realm of arms are working in close collaboration and mutual understanding.

"Did I hear that right? You said 'in close collaboration and mutual understanding'?" I asked a department chief of the national center for administering the destruction of short-range missiles, Col V.M. Germanovich.

"I think that these words are most suitable for describing the atmosphere in which the work is proceeding. It would have been simply impossible just a few years ago. And now today—and this is not just our opinion, but the opinion of the American specialists as well—we have found a common language here from the very beginning."

Vladimir Mikhaylovich, the immediate supervisor of the work on destroying the launchers for the OTR-22 and OTR-23 missiles, looked somewhat tired. He had a great deal on his shoulders to manage. And the main thing, responsibility.

Passing through the inspection station, we came to a large asphalt area, and on the left—looking somehow not military, amidst lawns with high grass—were three small houses, roughly like those that are used by construction workers.

"One for the American observer," explained Vladimir Mikhaylovich, "another for the representatives of the Soviet center and a third for joint sessions."

The houses were unoccupied at the moment, but the hangers across the way were boiling with work. The Bengal fires of welding scattered from three partially disassembled launchers. The telfers that the soldiers were using to lift the heavy parts rumbled from overwork. Others dismantled instruments and assemblies containing precious metals.

"You realize that the missile equipment was made to be reliable," continued the colonel. "The destruction process is thus not so easy as it could seem at first glance. The chief difficulty is that as opposed to the missiles themselves, which are destroyed by conventional explosion, here we are using processes so that after dismantling the most important assemblies from a military point of view, the tractors themselves remain intact and, after rehabilitation work, are sent on to 'complete further service' in the national economy. And the metal is proving to be so strong that even the plasma units that were specially developed for this purpose by the Electrical Welding Institute imeni Ye.O. Paton of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences is having difficulty cutting the launch assemblies."

I admit that my imagination had depicted something unusual before the trip. Everything nearby proved to be much more prosaic. Here much is reminiscent of a small shop in a plant. Only in the transparent cabs where the skilled craftsmen usually work were American inspectors and our officers.

Yes, it is as if the technological process is proceeding with an opposite sign. Whereas they make vehicles in a conventional plant, here they are destroying them. But it seems to me that I have never in all of my journalistic work seen more creative work than this destruction.

"We work from nine in the morning to six at night," explained Vladimir Mikhaylovich in laconic military fashion. "Strictly according to a set schedule. We dismantle three launchers every two days. The whole process of destroying short-range missiles is figured to take eighteen months."

"How often does the need arise to resolve specific issues with the inspectors?"

"Practically every day. No matter how detailed the agreement was made, you can't foresee everything in life, of course. Many decisions, and quite crucial ones, have to be made independently, after discussion with the

American side right on the site. Of course, any problem, even the smallest, can be hard to solve. If you want. We are seeing a desire to resolve issues quickly and without procrastination on the part of the inspectors. Here is a concrete example. At first the American side proposed cutting the missile container and its cover lengthwise.

"You can imagine what a job this is if I tell you that the length of the container is over 13 meters and it is not manufactured from tin by any means. We proposed cutting it crosswise, which would provide a greater economy of time and labor. After we set out our arguments for the inspectors, they met us halfway without even consulting their leader."

A break was called. The soldiers, putting down their tools, went past the inspection point to the break room. I went and sat with them. The soldiers talked about their discharge, and I, looking at their young faces, tried to understand the hidden sense of the fate that carries a person like a river somewhere unknown, but suddenly, making a complete turn, comes ashore, where it turns out you have already been. It is surprising, but it so happened that twenty years ago I served as a private in the local missile garrison. Like everyone, I went about on details, studied the difficult art of soldiering, jumped up at night at the alarm and went to the exercises. In '68 our unit went for live firing to Kapustin Yar, today well-known to the whole country, the first missile proving ground. Two months we lived in tents whipped by the bitter-cold steppe winds.

We worked on "launch" for two months. Having completed the mission and crossed the whole country again, we returned to Stankovo barracks, seeming almost a family home. And once again training, guard duty, motor-pool days. I recall how on the evening walks we would sing the gallant drill song whose refrain had the words "We are the missile soldiers, for us any target is near." Did we think much about what "any" target was? Not much, it seems.

Much has changed in the world over twenty years. It has changed, having irretrievably carried off billions of rubles and dollars, the labor of millions of people and more than one generation of combat equipment. Even my military specialty—artillery plotting—has ceased to exist. The plotters have been replaced with high-speed computers. And the time has come for sobering up. Thanks to the new political thinking, we have come to an understanding of a quite simple truth—the power of mankind is proving to be stronger than arms.

Could I, a soldier of '68, imagine then that in 1988 I would be talking with a lieutenant colonel of the U.S. Army about my family, my children and the world on the territory of my supersecret unit?

Niels Wurtzberger, a cultivated man of about fifty, extended his hand and said "hello" with almost no accent. It seems that he was attracted to Russian as early

as in college, which he completed twenty-five years ago. He has studied the literature of our country and some of its history. He was an Air Force pilot for a large portion of his career. He has four children—a son of sixteen and three daughters. His family was with him during his work in Great Britain, Berlin and in many corners of the United States. They were all very disappointed, said Niels, that they could not go on this trip together.

"My experience, unfortunately, is still not enough to form a complete impression of Soviet people, the more so the country. But it is clear from my first contacts that your people are practically no different from Americans. We like the friendliness of the Soviet people and their desire to know more about Americans. We have seen women and children in kindergarten as well as officers and soldiers. I am sure that people are people everywhere. They cannot help but strive for peace."

"Tell me, in your opinion, what are the reasons for the mistrust that has corroded our relations like rust for so many decades?"

"The reasons for this mistrust do not lie at the level of the peoples, in any case. That is my personal opinion..."

Our discussion went on for over an hour. When we left the negotiations house, an electric cart left the gates of the hangar carrying what had until quite recently been combat equipment, and had now become entirely civilian scrap metal.

It is understandable that an inspector observing the destruction of missiles and launchers is not a tourist. The time and conditions of his stay are fixed and regulated by treaty down to the last detail. Television is almost the sole diversion after work at night. That is why they accepted with great satisfaction a suggestion that went beyond the bounds of the treaty—to walk around Minsk during their days off, listen to a concert of folk music at the philharmonic. One more part of the cultural program was a visit to the cathedral and a frank discussion with a priest.

During an excursion the inspectors were shown the Troitskiy suburb and the House and Museum of the 1st RSDRP (Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party) Congress along with the new construction and park in Yanki Kupaly. The guests, judging from their opinions, liked Minsk very much and that is why, perhaps, no one paid any attention to a very minor occurrence—which happens quite often in the summer, by the way—rain, a warm sun shower, fell in the middle of the day. The Americans and the Russians covered themselves with their umbrellas and continued the excursion...

When it rains we put an umbrella over our head. All very simple. They do the same thing here and there. While cutting back on the not-so-cheap medium- and short-range missiles, they are spending billions in the United States to "cover" themselves with a nuclear space

umbrella. They say it will be as reliable as its brother-in-arms, the rain umbrella. But is it needed? Wouldn't it be safest to reject policies of thickening the clouds of nuclear danger over mankind altogether? These questions yet remain.

Some 18 OTR-22 missile launchers have been destroyed at Stankovo so far. It remains to destroy 220 launchers and 150 pieces of transport equipment. The work on the destruction of missiles will begin in the United States, West Germany and some other European countries on September 8.

U.S. INF Representative in Ulan Ude Interviewed
52000008 Ulan Ude PRAVDA BURYATII in Russian
6 Dec 88 p 3

[Interview with Jane Miller Floyd, under rubric "USSR-United States: INF Treaty in Action": "We Have Taken the First Step Toward Meeting Each Other Half Way: The Opinion of American Diplomacy Working in Ulan-Ude"]

[Excerpts] Recently, our correspondent P. Tsyrendorzhiev met with Jane Miller Floyd, First Secretary of the American Embassy in the USSR, and asked her about the reasons for creating in Ulan-Ude a representation of the U.S. Embassy.

[Floyd] There was just one reason. In conformance with the INF Treaty that was signed a year ago in Washington, both countries must have permanent points of entry for the inspectors who are checking the military items to be eliminated. In our country they are Washington and San Francisco, and in the Soviet Union, Moscow and Ulan-Ude.

Why Ulan-Ude? Originally Irkutsk had been proposed, but because of the redesigning of the airport in that city the Soviet Government proposed your city to the U.S. State Department as a point of entry.

[Tsyrendorzhiev] What are the questions the decision of which falls within the competency of the representation?

[Floyd] First of all, I must say that we are not executing here the functions of an embassy or consulate, but we are subject to all the statutes and laws that pertain to the activity of the diplomatic corps. Our chief task is to assure the normal operation of the entry point. For that purpose we have established contacts with all the Soviet services that provide for the execution of the INF Treaty.

[Tsyrendorzhiev] Are you satisfied with the reception that is being given to the American inspectors and to you people working at the representation?

[Floyd] We have received a very warm and friendly welcome. Both by the people and by the weather. I am living in Ulan-Ude with my husband and two children.

Of course you have your own problems and difficulties, but the most important thing is that there is an attempt to resolve them. [passage omitted]

[Tsyrendorzhiev] We have been following very attentively the progress of the negotiations in Geneva to develop the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. If progress is achieved in this area and a 50-percent reduction in intercontinental ballistic missiles begins, will the American mission in Ulan-Ude continue its work?

[Floyd] I can express only my personal point of view. If our countries sign this treaty, then, naturally, the points of entry for the inspection groups will be retained. But I will work in Ulan-Ude for approximately two more years. In the event that progress is achieved in Geneva, one can speak about our mission's further stay in the eastern part of the USSR. True, I do not know what city will be proposed—Irkutsk or Ulan-Ude. But I feel that it would be more effective to continue working here. Because practically all the problems linked with the acceptance of the inspection groups have been resolved, a program has been worked out, and all the questions that arise in the course of our work are being resolved efficiently by the local authorities.

[Tsyrendorzhiev] Do you think that the George Bush administration will continue the course taken by Ronald Reagan?

[Floyd] In my opinion, the succession will be preserved. After all, Bush was the vice-president, and in addition he is a Republican. I think that our countries will continue the constructive dialogue with regard to many questions of modern times.

[Tsyrendorzhiev] How was the signing of the INF Treaty perceived in the United States?

[Floyd] The man in the street in America welcomed this news as a good step toward a future without war. There were, of course, many disputes both among the ordinary citizens and in Congress. But it was not about stereotypes of perception of the Soviet Union. Rather, it was about the need, when resolving this important question, to discuss all the arguments and to consider all the alternatives. [passage omitted]

U.S. OSIA Director Interviewed During Inspection in Latvia
52000018 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
1 Jan 89 p 3

[Yu. Glants interview under the headline "Topical Interview: The Missiles Disappear at Noon," with Brigadier General R. LaJoie, director of the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, date and place not given. First paragraph is editorial introduction.]

[Text] Until fairly recently, very few people knew what was deployed at this military facility in the city of Jelgava. Now there are no more secrets, just as there are no more

RS-55 missiles. All of them (together with their launchers) are being eliminated in accordance with the INF treaty. To attest to that fact, a group of American specialists headed by Brigadier General R. LaJole, director of the On-Site Inspection Agency [OSIA], visited Latvia. Our correspondent asked the general to answer a few questions.

—Please tell us how the treaty is being fulfilled. Do you have any complaints against the Soviet side?

—From my point of view and from the point of view of the OSIA representatives the treaty is being fulfilled irreproachably. About 150 inspections have already been carried out, which have shown that the elimination of the missiles is proceeding as was agreed. Our side has no complaints.

—We understand everything which is happening now as being clearly a result of perestroika. In your view, what are the perspectives for further cooperation between our countries in preserving peace on Earth? In particular, how do you evaluate the possibility of a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms and what is your reaction to M.S. Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral half-million-man cut in our army?

—Much of what you are asking about touches on political questions, which go beyond what I can comment on. I will only say that, in the opinion of the United States, the policy of perestroika is a very positive phenomenon. As for the chances for a 50-percent arms cut, I know that our people, who are conducting these negotiations, are meeting in Geneva. And of course we wish them the very best success. One can only describe the intention of your general secretary's visit, which was unfortunately cut short by the tragedy in Armenia, as a great success.

—Tell us, if you can, what you like about our republic. Have you seen anything besides military facilities?

—We have an expression: An inspector is not a tourist. But nonetheless a very interesting program was organized for us. In fifteen minutes we should be at a concert at the Dom Cathedral. By the way, I am not visiting Latvia for the first time. Six years ago, while I was working at the American Embassy in Moscow, I had the opportunity to visit Riga. I know that for American diplomats the Baltic region, and especially Riga, is always of special interest.

—Will you be visiting us again? Or, in your opinion, has everything the treaty requires been done?

—The treaty says that on-site inspections may be made for the next 12 years. Therefore we will probably come back, but infrequently. The missiles are destroyed and the bases are empty.

—Then everything was done properly?

—Yes!

—Lieutenant Colonel N. Troyan joined the conversation:

—I am visiting the Baltic region for the first time. I find the sights and culture of this area striking. I would like to say how correctly and professionally the people who escorted us acted. In the name of my command and my general I would like to express our gratitude to them. I hope that when there are new on-site inspections they will send me here again.

—Then we will hope to meet again. Thank you for the interview and for the work you have done.

80 SS-20 Missile Launchers Destroyed at S. . . , Ukraine

LD1202201689 Kiev in English to Europe
1900 GMT 12 Feb 89

[Text] One more batch of missile launchers, a means of delivering SS-20 missiles, was destroyed near Sarny in Rovno region of the Ukraine. Several groups of experts from the United States visited the place and witnessed the liquidation of about 80 aggregate. All work is being conducted in strict abidance by the memorandum, pointed out the experts.

Inspectors in FRG for Missile Elimination

LD1302201789 Moscow TASS in English
1922 GMT 13 Feb 89

[Text] Bonn February 13 TASS—A group of 12 Soviet inspectors arrived in Frankfurt am Main on Monday. They will be present at the elimination of another batch of launching installations for U.S. Pershing-2 nuclear missiles in accordance with the Soviet-American INF Treaty which is to take place on February 14-16.

The missiles will be eliminated at the U.S. centre for the repair and maintenance of Pershing-2 missiles situated in Hausen, suburb of Frankfurt am Main. The installations each weighing over 10.5 tons will be cut into pieces by special gas burners and electric saws and sent for subsequent remelting.

The first nine out of 114 launching installations were destroyed last October. Pershing-2 missiles will be destroyed on U.S. territory.

19 Pershing-2 Launchers Destroyed in FRG

LD1702000689 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1900 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Text] In accordance with the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the latest batch of launchers for the U.S. intermediate-range Pershing-2 nuclear missiles has been destroyed at Hausen, near Frankfurt-am-Main. The work was carried out over the course of 3 days at a specially equipped unit. The destruction process was carried out in the presence of a group of Soviet inspectors. A total of 19 launchers from the missile complexes were liquidated over the 3 days. Thus, 86 of the 114 Pershing-2 complexes sited in the FRG remain. Destruction of the missiles making up these complexes will be carried out on U.S. territory.

CANADA

Reportage Commentary on Paris Chemical Weapons Conference

Foreign Minister Clark Addresses Conference
52200001 Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL*
in English 9 Jan 89 p A5

[Excerpt] Paris—External Affairs Minister Joe Clark appealed to all countries yesterday to "ban all chemical weapons ... to get rid of them everywhere and forever."

In a speech to a 140-country Paris conference on chemical weapons, Mr. Clark reminded delegates that "in April, 1915, Canadian soldiers were among the first to suffer the terror, pain and death inflicted by chemical weapons."

"It is a tragic part of Canada's national memory."

Chemical arms were first used during the First World War at Ypres, France—by the Germans. This led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such weapons, which the Paris conference is seeking to reinforce and extend.

"Surely it is the responsibility of governments to seek to limit our capability to inflict abhorrent cruelties and punishments on each other," Mr. Clark told delegates. "Chemical weapons can only provoke revulsion. Chemical weapons must be banned. We owe our citizens no less."

Mr. Clark addressed the session shortly after Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze surprised the conference with an announcement that the Soviet Union will start destroying its stockpile of chemical arms unilaterally this year. He gave no specific timetable.

Mr. Shevardnadze said that as soon as a new plant for the destruction of chemical weapons is complete, "we shall proceed immediately to the elimination of our chemical weapons stockpile."

Asked whether Mr. Shevardnadze's statement should force the hand of the United States to make a similar gesture, Mr. Clark told journalists: "I want to avoid a suggestion that there is some kind of contest marking the progress of the United States and the Soviet Union on some kind of race course. What is important is that there is a track on which there is movement. I think that's very important."

The Soviet Union and the United States are the only countries to admit having stocks of chemical arms.

In his speech, Mr. Clark reaffirmed Canada's policy of no use, production or stockpiling of chemical arms. "Canada's goal is to have all nations ban all chemical weapons ... to get rid of them everywhere and forever."

Soviet CW Destruction Announcement 'Not Helpful'

52200001 Ottawa *THE OTTAWA CITIZEN* in English
11 Jan 89 p A8

[Editorial: "Soviet Offer Not That Helpful"]

[Text] We won't live in a much safer world even if the Soviet Union does begin destroying its chemical weapons stockpile later this year as promised.

Behind the public relations bonanza reaped by the Soviets at the Paris conference on chemical weapons is the sobering reality that nobody really knows the extent of their stockpiles. The Soviets claim to have 50,000 tons, but western experts estimate they may have up to 300,000 tons of chemical arms in storage.

What's more, these weapons will remain in the Soviet arsenal for years to come because destroying them is a complex and expensive problem. It would take the Americans, who claim to have 30,000 tons of chemical weapons, at least 10 years to destroy their stockpiles in the eight plants now operating in the United States.

The Soviet Union's lone destruction plant will begin operating in 1989 and will take years to make a dent in their stock—much of which Western experts say is outdated in any case.

Most significantly, however, neither the Soviets nor the Americans have agreed to stop producing chemical weapons. What one plant destroys, another can replace with up-to-date arms as long as the negotiations in Geneva produce no agreement on a production ban.

Optimists hope the Soviet announcement will push the talks to a successful conclusion. In 1969, President Richard Nixon's unilateral decision to eliminate America's biological weapons stockpiles led to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

But back then, the international consensus was that biological weapons were of little use. In stark contrast, many Third World countries at the Paris conference are queued at Iraq's door anxious to buy chemical-weapon know-how. Having employed the weapons during the Gulf war, Iraq has the dubious honor of being an expert in their production and battlefield use.

The Soviets' decision to destroy their stockpile is welcome if only because it marks progress compared with a year ago, when Moscow wouldn't even admit to having such weapons. It is, however, too little, too late. The Pandora's box is open and it is doubtful that even the superpowers can do anything more than half-close the lid.

Editorial Urges End to Cruise Tests Over Canada
52200003 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
12 Jan 89 p A28

[Editorial: "End Cruise Tests and the Cold War"]

[Text] In a warm letter to the Kremlin this week, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney cited the exciting Soviet-Canadian transpolar ski expedition as living proof that Canada and the Soviet Union "are truly neighbors in the Arctic."

But Mulroney's ringing declaration that "times have clearly changed after many years of glacial confrontation" is sadly undercut by his decision to continue letting U.S. bombers test unarmed cruise missiles over Canada.

On many occasions, Washington has said northwestern Canada makes an ideal winter test range for the nuclear-capable, ground-hugging missile because the terrain so closely matches the flight approach to Moscow.

What kind of neighborliness does Canada demonstrate by authorizing two more of these provocative missile tests in the next few weeks, coincidentally while parliament is on holiday and political activity is at a low ebb?

Surely, this would have been an excellent opportunity for Mulroney to lead by example on arms control and disarmament issues, by stopping the weapons experiments.

So far, Ottawa has responded to the elimination of intermediate nuclear missile forces (INF) from Europe and to the announced Soviet withdrawal of six tank divisions from Eastern Europe by increasing its overseas troop commitments and by planning a Canadian fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.

Some thaw!

Back in 1983 when Canada agreed to the testing of the AGM-86B cruise weapon, it did so reluctantly, and with two important conditions attached.

First, former Liberal external affairs minister Allan MacEachen said on July 18, 1983, that the testing would only be necessary until "concrete results were achieved in the INF negotiations: namely, results that would decrease the level of missile deployment in Europe."

Second, then prime minister Pierre Trudeau stipulated that Canada would suspend the agreement if its continuance became, in any way, contrary to its arms control objectives.

This policy was reaffirmed once—but only once—in 1987 by the Progressive Conservatives when External Affairs Minister Joe Clark tied cruise testing to superpower talks on arms control: "We will determine Canadian government policy on the basis of what is actually decided in Geneva (site of the arms talks)."

But even in an improving climate of weapons control, it seems Mulroney prefers to write warm letters—while he keeps fighting the Cold War.

Foreign Minister Clark Urges Continued Negotiation, Military Deterrence
52200002 Toronto *THE SATURDAY STAR* in English
14 Jan 89 pp A1, A4

[Text] Calgary—External Affairs Minister Joe Clark says Canada should not be lulled into relaxing its defences by the Soviet Union's moves toward a more free and open system.

"Prudence demands that we maintain a credible military and political defence," Clark told about 200 students in a speech at the University of Calgary yesterday.

"One lesson which history has taught us is that negotiation based on mutual respect for each other's strength often succeeds. Negotiation from weakness cannot."

Clark said while Canada welcomes and applauds Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's movements away from a closed society, it should "avoid euphoria regarding Soviet intentions and measure accomplishments, not statements."

"While they (the Soviets) seek to be more responsive to the will of the people, they do not intend to turn the reins of power over to them," he said. Clark added that glasnost does not justify the belief that the Soviet Union will "eventually evolve into a free society as we understand the term."

The former prime minister said that in formulating its policy toward the Soviet Union, Canada must look at "all the faces" of that superpower. "Can we forget the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Afghanistan and the savage war which followed?"

Clark also reminded his audience that there are several eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany—where Communism was imposed by the Soviets. While some of these governments have been affected by glasnost, others remain impervious to change, he said.

Clark said Canada must never forget it is "a symbol and defender of free societies, to the point that in this century, over 100,000 Canadians paid with their lives to oppose totalitarian ambitions in Europe."

Clark said Canada must continue its support of the Western alliance's two-track strategy of negotiation and a credible military deterrence in dealing with the Soviet Union.

"Canada, as a free nation, as an ally, must continue to honor its obligation to make a contribution to the defence of the West," he said. "This will require active participation in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)."

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

More Fallout Over Involvement in Libyan CW Plant

Government Tightens Controls
LD1502174189 Hamburg DPA in German
1554 GMT 15 Feb 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to the Federal Government's information, Libya planned from the start to build a chemical weapons factory in Al-Rabitah. This emerges from a report submitted by Federal Minister of the Chancellery Wolfgang Schauble (CDU) to the Federal cabinet on Wednesday about the Libyan affair. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) gave the first indications concerning the factory on 22 April 1980.

At the instigation of Federal Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann (FDP), the Federal cabinet has decided to drastically tighten export controls and penalties for violating existing export regulations. In foreign policy terms, the 100-page government report submits the following conclusion to the Bundestag: "The Federal Government regards it as an urgent foreign policy task, in conjunction with partners and friends, to prevent Libya from starting production of chemical weapons."

Schauble said that with these moves the government has reached the limit of "what we see as possible in legal terms." Haussmann said that even after the drastic tightening, the FRG would not deviate from its free trade principles. At the same time the minister stressed that with more than 15 million export shipments, total supervision was not possible.

To elaborate, the cabinet has agreed to a change in the foreign trade law and the foreign trade and payments order and has noted with approval preliminary draft laws on changing the war weapons control law, the nuclear law, and the financial administration law.

Any involvement by Germans in the production of biological or chemical weapons may in the future be penalized with a 2-to-15-year sentence. Until now, there had been no legal provision against the involvement of Germans in projects such as those carried out in Libya.

Government Increases Penalties
AU1602101589 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 16 Feb 89 p 1

[sm] report: "More Bans and Increased Penalties for Illegal Exports"

[Text] Bonn, 15 February—The government wants to tighten controls, intensify investigations, impose new bans, and increase penalties to prevent the passing on of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the future. Economics Minister Haussmann announced this after yesterday's cabinet meeting, during which the government adopted the report—which will be submitted to the Bundestag—on the possible involvement of German companies in the production of chemical weapons in Libya.

The proposals approved by the cabinet to tighten foreign trade controls are to be embodied in new laws and regulations. They focus on the following four objectives:

- Information and control will be tightened by increasing the exchange of important information between competent authorities. Export declarations, for example, will not only be checked by the customs authorities and the central statistical office but also by the Tariff Criminal Investigations Institute and the Federal Economic Institute. The Customs Investigation Office will establish a corresponding data collection system.

- The Environment Ministry will draw up a list of nuclear equipment for which permissions are required, which will be passed on to the Economics and Finance Ministries. New regulations governing the registration of goods, plants, and technologies in the nuclear, biological, and chemical sphere will be introduced for manufacturers and dealers.

- The Customs Investigation Office will be involved in the cooperation between the intelligence services and the police concerning the exchange of information on the illegal export of sensitive goods.

- More goods and countries of destination will be subject to permission. This concerns eight chemical products as well as plants that are suited for the production of biological warfare agents. The list of the coordinating committee for multilateral export controls will be extended to countries outside the East Bloc. Transit trade with sensitive goods will generally be subject to permission. OECD countries will continue to be exempted from these restrictions.

- Penalties for violations of export restrictions will be further increased. As a result of an amendment of the war weapons control law, the participation of German companies in the development and production of biological and chemical weapons abroad will be penalized with a 2-to-15-year sentence. The ban on such

activities abroad is accompanied by a ban on such activities at home. The amended war weapons control law will not provide for possibilities of obtaining a permission for activities in this sphere in the FRG.

As agreed by the cabinet on 20 December 1988, the range of punishment for violations of the foreign trade law will be increased from 3 to 5 years. In addition to that, the maximum penalty for the breach of administrative rules will be doubled to DM1 million.

The Justice Ministry is currently checking whether it is possible to introduce gross skimming off of excessive profits instead of net skimming off of excessive profits.

—The appropriate authorities will receive more personnel and equipment. Haussmann stated that as far as his sphere of responsibility is concerned, the personnel of the appropriate department at the Federal Economic Institute in Eschborn will be increased from 70 to 200 employees, and in the Economics Ministry a new section for international export controls will be created.

Press Views Affair

AU1602105189 Cologne DEUTSCHLANDFUNK
in German 0605 GMT 16 Feb 89

[From the press review]

[Text] Yesterday Minister of the Chancellery Schaeuble presented to the cabinet his report on the participation of German companies in arms production in Libya. In this connection, the NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG notes: Slowly but surely there is some light in the darkness of the Libyan affair. The FRG Government gives little favorable impression in this respect. It is, however, to be welcomed that Schaeuble is now taking the bull by the horns. The new facts and data presented with scrupulous exactitude give evidence of the efforts to completely clear up the flow of information and decisionmaking in the FRG. What remains decisive is the question of why the various indications pointing to Al-Qadhdhafi's chemical weapons plant were not assessed with sufficient thoroughness and did not lead to any consequences. After all, they had been in existence since 1980, when Helmut Schmidt was still chancellor. A stamp on the document and then put on file—in the case of Libya, Bonn's red tape was a bit too twisted, NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG writes.

SUEDKURIER, which is published in Konstanz, expressed the following view: The report confirms the U.S. accusations that have been voiced for months, namely that if the FRG Government had more intensively investigated them, or previous information from the Federal intelligence service, the damage could have been limited. Now, however, there is the impression internationally that the export-oriented Germans put the vocally expressed demand for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons into the background in favor of expected

business with Libya. The tightening of export controls and penalties in case of violations of current regulations, which was decided yesterday, is necessary, but both will mostly be interpreted as an expression of a guilty conscience, the SUEDEKURIER believes.

The daily DIE WELT expounds: Sometimes entrepreneurs make life easy for the politicians. In January the chemical industry already signaled its agreement with tightening export controls for chemical substances that can be used for the production of chemical weapons. It did that without actually being affected: Even though Imhausen is a member of the Chemical Industry Association, it delivers equipment, that is, machine-building products and not chemical products. Thus, it was easy for Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann to push through an expansion of the export control list—which to date has contained eight items—by another nine products. The chemical industry, which, after the latest experiences in the Iran-Iraq war, is probably dealing once again with the most somber side of its art, even presented the proposals for expansion, the daily DIE WELT explains.

The STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN stresses: Now the FRG Government has closed some of the worst holes in its foreign trade. Raising penalties does not look bad at first glance. The weak point in the struggle against unscrupulous businessmen is, above all, the gross lack of inspectors in the Federal Economic Office. It will not be possible to change this quickly, even though Economics Minister Haussmann is urging remedies.

After the STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN, we come to the NEUE PRESSE from Hannover: The coalition seems to overlook that such smugglers are not simple rascals but unscrupulous profiteers: They are organized internationally and are able to pay any kind of fine out of petty cash with a smile. The arms mafia must be deprived of the basis for its work by political means. A radically tightened military materiel law would be a beginning, the NEUE PRESSE from Hannover is convinced.

Al-Qadhdhafi Refuses Plant Inspection

AU1302102789 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
13 Feb 89 p 17

[Unattributed report: "No Inspection"]

[Text] At the last minute Libyan head of state Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi has withdrawn his offer to have three European scientists inspect the disputed chemical plant in Al-Rabitah.

Chemical expert Dieter Meissner from Hannover, the representative of the FRG "Natural Scientists' Initiative," was called out of the line at Frankfurt Airport right before his departure for Tripoli, because the Libyan authorities refused to grant the promised visa.

Meissner, who had been promised a "complete inspection" at Al-Rabitah, assessed the thwarted visit as an admission that "there is something to be hidden" in the chemical factory. Tripoli has now promised to let a British scientific delegation visit, however, the earliest time will be in March.

SPD Defense Expert Interviewed on Soviet Military Doctrine

AU1502134889 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 15 Feb 89 p 5

[Interview with Katrin Fuchs, member of the SPD Presidium and of the Bundestag Defense Committee, by Edgar Auth after her return from Moscow, where SPD experts and scientists acquainted themselves with the new Warsaw Pact military doctrine: "SPD Expert Katrin Fuchs: The Soviet Army Is Reducing Its Striking Power"; date and place not given]

[Text]

[Auth] In Moscow you acquainted yourself with the restructuring of the military strategy toward "defensive sufficiency." How far have the Soviets already gone in turning away from their old, rather offensive defense strategy?

[Fuchs] We were assured by our interlocutors that although to date the military doctrine and strategy of the Soviet Union has been defensive, it did, however, have strong offensive potentials. This was mainly expressed in the mass of combat tanks. While to date the Soviet Union has been following the strategy of advancing into enemy territory after an attack to devastatingly beat the enemy there, it now intends to establish a strong defense, which will ensure defense in case of an attack on Warsaw Pact states and would not cross the Pact borders.

[Auth] How much have the Soviets achieved in the adjustment to this new strategy?

[Fuchs] They have already made some progress in training. Major General Batenin, who is an adviser at the Central Committee, and Colonel General Chervov told us that the training of the troops has been radically altered since about mid-1987. Defensive tactics are increasingly practiced, even down to the divisions. A new textbook for officer students has already been drawn up. However, the field service regulations will take a bit longer because this is a complicated process. For this purpose, some troop exercises still have to be made. But it is in the works, we were told.

[Auth] What is happening among the active troops?

[Fuchs] The more important issue is the practical adjustment of the troops on site, on which we also asked some questions. Some interesting things were the result: For the first time it was admitted that there are operational maneuver groups. Of the six tank divisions, which are to

be withdrawn and demobilized, five belong to the operational maneuver groups. The sixth in Hungary does not have the features of an operational maneuver group. Of these five offensive maneuver groups, two will be disbanded in the GDR this year, and another two in the GDR in 1990. The offensive maneuver group in the CSSR will also be eliminated. Thus, the elements which the West has been considering particularly threatening will be eliminated.

[Auth] What will happen with the divisions that remain in Eastern Europe?

[Fuchs] In the tank division the number of tanks will be reduced by 20 percent, and Batenin also gave us an example of restructuring. To date a tank division has had three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment. Now one tank regiment will be withdrawn and replaced by such a rifle regiment, so that in the future every tank division will have two motorized rifle regiments and two tank regiments. In addition, Batenin said that the lost offensive firing power will now be replaced by antitank weapons as long as the disarmament steps are unilateral. If disarmament steps are taken on both sides, the Soviets would renounce antitank weapons. In total, 5,300 tanks will be withdrawn. The six tank divisions, however, amount to only 2,000 tanks. The remaining 3,300 will be taken from the remaining divisions. In this connection it is interesting that they will not be withdrawn individually, so to speak, but that entire units will be disbanded, which is particularly important to us.

[Auth] Which kinds of tanks will be withdrawn?

[Fuchs] We were assured that all 5,300 tanks will be T72's and T80's, that is, the most modern ones they have.

[Auth] How long will the Warsaw Pact need for this restructuring?

[Fuchs] It is to be concluded by 1990.

[Auth] Western politicians often miss the deeds behind the words from Moscow. Were you given any hard facts?

[Fuchs] Yes, I think the fact that the exact changes of these troops, tanks, and combat planes were presented to us is evidence of the fact that restructuring is really taking place. Another piece of information in this connection: In the Soviet border defense districts—the Baltic, the Carpathian, and the Belorussian defense districts—troops are also being restructured. There machinegun divisions and artillery divisions are being established on the basis of the existing motorized rifle divisions. These are divisions with high fire power but with low mobility. What I want to say in general is the following: The Soviet Union is carrying out real restructuring in all spheres of its defense. Every expert knows that it is an important change if the tank regiments are taken out and motorized rifle regiments are used instead.

Then the striking power that existed before is missing. This is the most interesting aspect and it was new even to some of the Soviets accompanying us.

[Auth] What do you think the West has to do as a response to the unilateral advance moves of the Warsaw Pact to promote the disarmament process?

[Fuchs] I think that two things are important. First, one has to renounce the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG. Negotiations with the Warsaw Pact states on these tactical nuclear weapons should be started as soon as possible. This is also a proposal made by the Soviet Union. Second, it will be very important and it will be in our interest that constructive proposals be made by NATO, which contain considerable reductions also on the side of NATO, because only then would the prospects for bilateral disarmament promise success. We, too, could then be freed from a large part of defense burdens.

[Auth] In which spheres would NATO have to disarm?

[Fuchs] I think we have to disarm in troop strength. We also have to disarm offensive weapon systems and tanks. For me, it is very clear that the issue of combat planes also has to be discussed. In this respect, NATO must make more decisive offers in order to negotiate this issue at a very early time.

FRANCE

Reaction to, Comments on Paris Chemical Weapons Conference

Industry Warned on Watchfulness

52002408 Paris LES ECHOS in French 6 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by Alix de Vogue: "Opening of the Conference on Chemical Weapons: Manufacturers Face Risks of Proliferation"]

[Text] The Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons will open in Paris on Saturday. Its goals are, first, to reassert at political level the Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of these weapons and, second, to provide impetus for the multilateral negotiations currently held on the subject in Geneva. These negotiations aim to draw up a convention on the controlled prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks.

Manufacturers cannot ignore the current proliferation. In fact, some of the chemicals they manufacture are used in several processes leading to a wide variety of products. Thus, intermediates used to manufacture insecticides or pharmaceuticals may also serve as a base for neurotoxic gases.

Of course, one may ask whether certain large chemical manufacturers have the capabilities to produce finished products such as suffocating, vesicant or neurotoxic gases. In the past, the French department of powders has done it. And today, one of the consequences—and a very interesting one—for SNPE [National Powder and Explosives Company] is its activity as a supplier of nail polish bases. During World War I, the Rhone-Poulenc plant at Pont-de-Claix manufactured chemical warfare gases. After World War II, research at ICI [Imperial Chemical Industry] widely contributed to the development of type-5 neurotoxic gases.

But without speculating on matters classified as "defense secrets," we may observe that certain industrial groups are routinely involved merely because they manufacture multi-purpose semi-finished products.

If some substances were exclusively designed for military purposes, control would be easier. But it is not possible to prohibit products that are commonly used for civil purposes and indispensable to the proper operation of various processes. Even when, through certain of these processes, they find military "outlets." It is precisely because they are relatively easy to obtain (financially and technologically) that chemical weapons have become "the poor man's nuclear weapons."

The United States and the Soviet Union are the only countries to acknowledge that they possess stocks of chemical weapons. There would be 40,000 tons of chemical substances in the United States and about 300,000 tons of chemical ammunition in the USSR (estimates vary between 200,000 and 700,000 tons). However, most experts agree that, currently, over 20 countries possess chemical weapons or the capacity to manufacture them; 20 years ago, the chemical weapons "club" counted only 5 members.

The "Australian Group"

As risks increase, one way to check proliferation consists in monitoring shipments of some dual-purpose substances. Countries used to do that each for themselves; then the need was felt to coordinate efforts around basic lists, even if it meant that administrations had to erect additional barriers. As a result, an informal structure was set up, the "Australian" group which counts 19 participating countries from the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and works like a sort of COCOM for sensitive chemicals. It is said to be called "Australian" because it is supposed to have held its first meeting at the Australian embassy in Paris. Its members, therefore, are large chemical exporters. The participants are said to have drawn up a list of 40 chemical substances. For the first eight (and soon a ninth) a preliminary export declaration is mandatory.

The manufacturer provides information on the purchaser, the quantity requested and the information supplied as to the use of the product. The administration may either give the green light or request additional information, or oppose its veto.

Tightly Controlled Products

For five key products, exports to four "suspect" countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria—are prohibited. Three of these products, in particular, can be used as bases for neurotoxic gases: thiodiglycol (an intermediate for pharmaceuticals), methyl phosphonyl bifluoride (an intermediate in the insecticide manufacturing process) and dimethyl phosphite.

The other sensitive products are on a warning list. This means that manufacturers have an obligation to report suspicious orders, and governments exchange information.

"Civil" chemical industries, which already contribute to proliferation control, will become increasingly involved. In fact, the Geneva negotiations deal with the implementation of an inspection system to control both declared chemical weapon centers and industrial companies to make sure that civil production will not be diverted to military ends. This, of course, will pose confidentiality problems. Already, the Geneva negotiators have contacted the professionals to consider well-defined inspection procedures designed to preserve the confidentiality of the processes.

Conference Not Sufficient

52002408 Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Jan 89 p 1

[Article by Jacques Jacquet-Francillon: "The Poor Man's Yalta"]

[Text] With his inimitable unction, coming down from the Elysian Olympus, Francois Mitterrand denounced the horror of chemical weapons. The words he chose do not call for any reservation. They were strong words. They were the right words. But words are not enough; there should be some action. At any rate, there are actors. The so-called "Superpowers." Those who can bring us the worst or the best.

The conference, which currently brings together representatives from 145 countries, is taking place in Paris because France is the repository of the 1925 protocol, the initial treaty condemning the use of chemical weapons.

We therefore fittingly play the part of the host—and that is a good thing; but what else can we do at a time when—rightly or wrongly—we are suspected of preparing to sell to Libya the Mirage 2000 which, had the contract been signed earlier, would have ensured Colonel al-Qadhafi's victory over U.S. Navy fighters in the Mediterranean sky a few days ago. Colonel Qadhafi said so himself, loud and clear.

What can come out of this prestigious diplomatic "happening" on the banks of the Seine? Not much; except a solemn declaration of intention condemning these "barbaric weapons." It is not insignificant; but it is far from enough.

Tomorrow, who will be in a position to prevent Iraq from using once again these hateful toxic gases to wrest another victory on the battlefield?

Who will be in a position to put an end to Qadhafi's blackmail and to the threat he brandishes with his—real or imagined—sinister Rabta plant?

Will it be the United States, via punitive air raids that would alienate its best allies in the Arab world?

Yes, if it had no other choice.

There is another choice. It is the tacit agreement concluded already over 1 year ago between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.

At the Paris Conference, the U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, denounced the states which usually provide support to international terrorism and are now about to acquire chemical weapon capabilities. He did not mention Libya.

His Soviet counterpart, Edward Shevardnadze, answered him yesterday, from the same tribune, warning both "those who manufacture chemical weapons... and those who intend to perfect them." He could not have been more clear.

Colonel Qadhafi may well expel from his country 250 reporters who had come from all over the world, at his invitation, to be the witnesses to his "innocence"; but he cannot fail to hear some messages.

Chemical weapons have been called "the atomic bomb of the poor." The Paris Conference will undoubtedly go down in history as the "poor man's Yalta."

Military Protective Measures

52002408 Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "France: Protection First"]

[Text] All Army units are equipped with decontamination equipment. But no ammunition stocks have been provided.

The French position on chemical weapons is based on the Geneva protocol signed by 110 countries on 20 July 1925, prohibiting the use of toxic or similar gases. However, the superpowers of the time (including France), which signed the agreement, expressed reservations, indicating that they would retain the right to manufacture, store and use chemical weapons if they were attacked. In other words, only the first use was prohibited.

This position has changed since 29 September of last year, when Francois Mitterrand formulated three proposals at the tribune of the United Nations:

- to convene a meeting of the 110 countries of the Geneva agreement to reassert the commitments of 1925;
- to increase the role and resources of the United Nations: commission of investigation on the theaters of conflicts, sanctions, exclusion of belligerents making use of chemical weapons;
- and finally something new: global prohibition of the manufacture of chemical weapons.

For its part, France is now in a state of scientific and technological "watch," especially as far as protection is concerned.

All Army units are equipped with protection and decontamination equipment. But none of our forces possesses ammunition stocks (shells, rockets, missiles or dissemination containers). Conversely, the Red Army, highly trained for operation in a chemical environment, is said to possess several hundreds of thousands of tons of toxic gases and a corps of 60,000 specialists represented at all levels. Faced with the terrible threat of bacteriologic and chemical weapons, the French Army has increased tenfold its budget for individual and collective protection.

Decontamination Lines

The protection is fourfold. Detection and alarm, using a sophisticated piece of equipment, the "détalac," which is on preventive watch around the clock. Individual protection necessitates that all combat troops wear a hooded suit, gloves and a gas-tight mask. But this equipment, being rigid and tight, reduces the mobility and capabilities of operating units.

The result of 10 years of research, new protective uniforms are being set into service; they can be worn at all times and are perfectly gas-tight and as light as fatigues. A new mask capable of withstanding the perfluorated agents that would go through the cartridges of current gas masks, will soon be allotted. In addition, all combat vehicles are designed to perform in an NBC [nuclear, bacteriologic or chemical] environment.

The unit has also been equipped with personnel and vehicle decontamination lines. They include steam generators and high-pressure washing equipment. The contaminated soldiers are stripped of their clothes, which are burned on the spot, go through prophylactic chambers and receive new uniforms when they exit.

Collective protection uses fixed shelters or vehicles equipped with regeneration systems. To accelerate decontamination, powerful water jets or hot air jets are used; they project products on the equipment parts that present the greater danger through direct contact (doors, controls, crew's compartments).

The specific research carried out by defense scientists is top secret. But for several years already, France has had the resources required to produce chemical weapons in series. And a new and frightfully efficient carrier, the multiple-launch rocket system, could deliver over 7,500 neurotoxic or "stunning" rounds of ammunition at a distance of 35-40 km... within 1 minute.

Geneva Continuation a Must

52002408 Paris *LIBERATION* in French 12 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Alfredo Valladao: "Geneva: Gains That Must Be Consolidated"]

[Text] Industrialized countries have become aware that no disarmament process can exclude the rest of the world. And, for the first time, countries from the South have started a true strategic debate. There remains to ensure that an agreement is signed in Geneva to prohibit chemical weapons forever.

Until now, strategic debates were the preserve of East and West powers. The Paris conference on chemical weapons marked the irruption of countries from the South in the debate. The final document adopted yesterday actually represents a clever compromise between the widely divergent perceptions of the national security issue expressed by the 149 participating states.

This time, the goal was not to take a stand on major moral principles or on the need for a world without weapons. Rather, it was to decide in favor of a well-defined disarmament process—chemical weapons—which could have direct repercussions on state defense and on certain aspects of state sovereignty. Titanic work was accomplished in the last 4 days by the so-called "nonaligned" group to harmonize demands as clear-cut as those of Iraq and the Arab states, Iran, and other developing countries. It is therefore not an overstatement to say that the Paris conference represents the foundation stone of a strategic South-South debate.

For the first time, too, the North did not have to face the usual discourse on disarmament and development, but countries, some of which are beginning to have the resources required to acquire mass destruction weapons. The recent progress made concerning the reduction of the nuclear weapons of the two superpowers, together with the dissemination of more advanced military technologies among the Third World, mandate a dialogue. Industrialized countries are becoming aware of the limitations of a disarmament process that would exclude the rest of the world. South states, for their part, face the overwhelming responsibility of strategic decisions fraught with consequences, both for their security and for their national budgets.

The success of the Paris conference comes at the right time. Indeed, the "window" is particularly favorable to negotiations on disarmament. The recent detente between Washington and Moscow, the signature of the

INF agreement providing for the elimination of "Euro-missiles," the forthcoming opening of talks on traditional forces in Europe, create a favorable climate within NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the technology required to manufacture modern chemical weapons, and the carriers needed for such weapons, is becoming available in the Third World although it is not widely "disseminated" yet. It is therefore possible to try and check the chemical-warfare race before it gets out of control. Especially since most countries interested in chemical weapons still have doubts as to the actual "deterrent" value of these weapons and fear the improbable issue of competition in this respect.

In Geneva, the conference on disarmament has made much progress in the preparation of a convention that would prohibit these weapons. Major political differences were resolved, but much work is still required on technical questions related to verification of the agreement. As is known, the problems involved in the verification of the INF agreements were solved in 2 months, once political determination was manifest. Controlling the chemical industry is an infinitely more complex task. But, if the Paris conference really caused the emergence of a political will, a consensus should be reached rather rapidly in Geneva.

That would leave a basic problem: a worldwide strategic debate implies worldwide solutions to the problem of disarmament. Already, a convention banning chemical weapons must be "universal," with a single set of laws applying to all countries, big and small. Therefore, the irruption of the South in the strategic debate will lead to a strengthening of international law. But how could the legal practices—and even some constitutional provisions—of countries with a strong tradition of state control be harmonized with the practices of very "liberal" countries, those of democracies with those of dictatorships? In Geneva, for instance, the U.S. Constitution poses one of the questions that will be difficult to resolve in connection with the inspection of chemical facilities. It protects individuals and private businesses against the state to an extent that does not exist in most European countries—still less to the East and to the South. Also, how will finicky international controls over one of their key industries, the chemical industry, affect the economies of the states involved? In all cases, each state will have to agree to give up some of its national sovereignty. On a global scale, this is no small matter.

The Paris conference, therefore, achieved gains which must be consolidated in Geneva. Third World countries must also be convinced that their national security will be enhanced by the prohibition of chemical-warfare gases, even if nuclear "proliferation" remains untouched. As chemical disarmament and the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers progress, the acquisition of atomic weapons by new countries will become a problem of vital importance. The era of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States alone is slowly fading away. A revival of multilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons is therefore unavoidable.

Debate Useful

52002408 Paris *LES ECHOS* in French 10 Jan 89 p 44

[Article: "A Useful Debate, After All"]

[Text] As was to be expected, and as French officials somehow feared, the work of the Paris Conference on chemical weapons was largely overshadowed by political questions, in particular the U.S.-Libyan dispute, the Iraqi-Iranian controversy, and apartheid in South Africa. In addition, many bilateral negotiations, certainly useful and fruitful, somehow caused the participants to lose sight of the true object of the meeting, i.e. the preparation of a new convention to prohibit the use, manufacture and possession of chemical weapons.

Actually, it would have been unrealistic—and President Mitterrand himself had no illusions in this respect—to expect the 141 participating countries to express anything but pious wishes in just these few days. Yet, the indispensable will to make international public opinion aware of the terrible threats that chemical weapons represent has already made it possible, halfway through the Conference, to define the limitations of the undertaking. Thus, many developing countries make a very clear connection between chemical and nuclear weapons; the former, they believe, can disappear only if the latter are eliminated. The control procedures that will be mandatory represent another major obstacle in that they will be more easily circumvented by large or medium-size powers, and may offend some national susceptibilities.

At a time when Washington and Moscow multiply their initiatives to reduce centers of tensions throughout the world, it would still be a mistake to be difficult about the Paris Conference. It has the merit that it opened an extremely complex debate which, in spite of all reservations, could eventually have positive repercussions.

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